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A Review of Catherine A. Rogers’s ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*

ABSTRACT
This Review Essay explores the major contributions of the first systematic
effort to describe and call for international and “internal regulation” of ethics
standards for international arbitration, including commercial, investor-state and
other forms of trans-border arbitration of legal disputes. This Essay first situates
the particular ethical dilemmas in international arbitration within the larger
jurisprudential questions raised by the legal justifications that create and support
international arbitration. It then describes some of the particular ethical issues,
including conflicts of interests, use of experts, legal systemic differences in rules,
ethics and practices, third party funding of arbitrations, discovery and evidentiary rules and conflicts and variations in treatment of these issues as a form of
“comparative ethics” that must be “harmonized” in some way. The Essay
concludes with suggestions for thinking through some of the dilemmas in creating
a cross-legal system of ethics and standards regime, including questions of
content, enforcement, commitment, and transparency, while preserving some of
the conflicting values of international arbitration—privacy, party choice, and
consent over both process and substantive issues. The Essay raises the worry that
macro-ethical concerns about systemic legitimacy and transparency may be
different from micro-ethical behavioral and party-level ethical issues. International arbitration ethics concerns demonstrate that modern law and ethics are
truly “transnational”—not tethered to a particular legal system, with all the
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issues and contradictions that such trans-systemic legal regimes have come to
represent.
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INTRODUCTION: DEEP ISSUES AND PRACTICAL REALITIES IN TRANSNATIONAL
PRACTICE EQUAL ETHICAL LEGAL PLURALISM
Wrapped in the elegant gold-leaf detail of Gustav Klimt’s Tree of Life
painting,1 Catherine Rogers’s book, Ethics in International Arbitration, contains
a world of antinomies, controversies and proposed solutions to the many complex
issues involved in transnational legal practice, and whether we can or should
make ethical standards to guide such practice. This Review Essay both reviews
this important book and situates the book in the larger issues of transnational

1. CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION Cover (2014) (showing Gustav Klimt, Tree
of Life (1909)). This beautiful cover is itself both an appropriate and an ironic cover for a book about
transnational legal ethics. Several of Gustav Klimt’s famous paintings, as well as those of many other artists,
have been the subject of much complicated and controversial transnational litigation (and arbitration!) as
survivors and heirs of survivors of the Holocaust have sought to recover the art unlawfully confiscated by the
Nazis before and during World War II. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE O’CONNOR, THE LADY IN GOLD: THE
EXTRAORDINARY TALE OF GUSTAV KLIMT’S MASTERPIECE, PORTRAIT OF ADELE BLOCH-BAUER (2012); LYNN
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD
WAR (1994).

Electronic Electronic
copy available
at:available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746233
copy
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2746233

2016]

ETHICAL ORDERING IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE?

209

jurisprudence. It explores the sources, justifications, and critiques of a legal
dispute resolution regime that is not necessarily tethered to any particular
sovereign legal regime.
Like an ever growing tree of life, with deep roots, new generations,2 and both
growing and dying branches and leaves, international arbitration is, in some
senses, centuries old, and at the same time, as new as today. Recent international
treaties have expanded the substantive and dispute resolving rules and mechanisms for global governance of increasingly complicated issues that span both
public and private matters. Globalization of so many domains, including
commercial, financial, investment, environmental, criminal, cultural, religious,
and even domestic (family) relations has led to many forms of dispute resolution,
rule formation,3 legal enforcement, as well as private, formal state, and hybrid
governance.4 How the increasingly transnational legal world does or could
resolve its many disputes is one of the major issues of our growing transnational
legal pluralism.5
Whether we can find or create ethical standards to govern transnational and
multi-cultural legal practice is the focus of Professor Rogers’s important book
and this review.6 What exactly are transnational legal ethics? What are the
problems or issues that have provoked interest and increasing efforts by leading
arbitral institutions to promulgate such rules and guidelines?7 A variety of

2. The now classic sociological mapping of generations within the international arbitration field is YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE MAKING OF
A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) [hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE], which contrasted
the European “grand old men” to the Anglo-American “new technocrats.” New empirical and legal scholarship
now documents a third generation of “managerial” arbitrators who can manage complex transnational
arbitration in more varied contexts than private international commercial arbitration. See e.g., Thomas Schultz
& Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators?: Fifteen Years after Dezalay and Garth, 28
ARB. INT’L 161 (2012); JOSHUA KARTON, THE CULTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRACT LAW (2013); Luke Nottage, The Vicissitudes of Transnational Commercial Arbitration and the Lex
Mercatoria: A View from the Periphery, 16 ARB. INT’L 53 (2000) [hereinafter Nottage, Transnational
Commercial Arbitration]; Luke R. Nottage, A Weathermap for International Arbitration: Mainly Sunny, Some
Cloud, Possible Thunderstorms (July 13, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽2630401 [http://perma.cc/R8CD-PLK3].
3. In the legal jurisprudence of international arbitration there are interesting debates now in both procedural
or adjectival law (process, ethics, rules, evidence production, etc.) and substantive law (international common
law, lex mercatoria, contract theory and interpretation, common vs. civil law norms and legal reasoning, etc.).
See, e.g., Nottage, Transnational Commercial Arbibtration, supra note 2.
4. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2005) [hereinafter SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD];
NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Michael
Helfand ed., 2015) [hereinafter STATE AND NON-STATE LAW].
5. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); Duncan Kennedy, Three
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (Alvaro Santos & David M. Trubek, eds., 2006); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How
to Study “Transnational” Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2011) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Why and How].
6. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 1–17, 365–72 (2014).
7. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2014), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid⫽e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10dd33dafee8918 [http://perma.cc/HFW9-FC5C]; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRE-
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concerns based on jurisprudential questioning of international arbitration have
led to this moment of dialogue, discussion, debate and Professor Rogers’s
issue-defining book. These concerns range from legitimacy of the private or
hybrid international law dispute resolution system (a central concern of Professor
Rogers in this book8), to international and demographic diversity of practitioners
or parties,9 competition with more formal means of dispute resolution (national
courts or other tribunals), transparency of decision-making and process, a desire
for more uniformity or universalism in international dispute resolution, and
governance or just a more general sense of fairness and justice in legal
decision-making.
This Review Essay is written for specialists—those who practice, study and
teach international arbitration,10 legal ethicists both domestic and international,
and for more general readers interested in issues about the globalization of
judicial and alternative dispute resolution processes or “process pluralism.”11
Professor Rogers’s book seeks to answer two key questions. First, whether
dispute resolution systems, like international arbitration, require ethical standards, which are complied with or enforced somehow, in order to secure
legitimacy, party and systemic acceptability, compliance, and appreciation of
particular justice values. Second, whether such standards can be developed and
effectively implemented in trans-cultural legal settings. Answering these ques-

SENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION (2013), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentU
id⫽6F0C57D7-E7A0-43AF-B76E-714D9FE74D7F [http://perma.cc/WW85-WVXD]; LONDON COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ETHICS RULES (2014); see also William Park, A Fair Fight: Professional
Guidelines in International Arbitration, 30 ARB. INT’L 409 (2014) [hereinafter Park, Fair Fight].
8. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 3–7.
9. See, e.g., Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387 (2014); see also
SUSAN D. FRANCK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: DEMOGRAPHICS, PRECISION AND JUSTICE (2015)
[hereinafter FRANCK, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION]. Although the International Bar Association began promulgating guidelines and standards for conflicts of interests in international arbitration some years ago, the question
of motivations for promulgation of such standards remains an interesting socio-legal question: What harm or
damage occurs to clients when there are conflicts of interests (if not consented to), or what damage or harm to
the transnational system of justice of arbitration? Critics of these efforts to promulgate standards (see below) see
a desire to enforce strong conflicts of interests standards in order to disqualify some of the “grand old men,” see
DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 2, and provide more opportunity for greater diversity among
newer, younger and more diverse international arbitrators. See Benjamin G. Davis, American Diversity in
International Arbitration 2003-2013, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 255 (2014); see also Benjamin G. Davis, Diversity
in International Arbitration, 20 ABA DISP. RESOL. MAG. 13.
10. For a formal statement of how international arbitration has now become not only a field of practice but
one of scholarly and pedagogic importance, see Thomas Schultz, Editorial, The Evolution of International
Arbitration as an Academic Field, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 229 (2015). From Queen Mary in London to
Georgetown and George Washington in Washington, DC and Columbia and NYU in New York, many law
schools now offer courses, externships and even degrees in international arbitration.
11. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal
Processes, 94 GEO. L. J. 553 (2006) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice]; Menkel-Meadow, Why
and How, supra note 5; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute].
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tions, as Professor Rogers has attempted to do in her book, implicates deeply
important questions about the role of the rule of law, the complexity of increasing
pluralism in our globalizing legal world, and what levels of enforcement are
appropriate in a legally plural world.
Issues of legal pluralism include both more traditional “horizontal” pluralism
of multiple nation-states and now more diverse “vertical” pluralism as many
international, transnational and regional legal institutions rule simultaneously or
serially on the same matters in different fora.12 Enforcement issues include
whether crafting and enforcement of ethical standards can or should be
conducted in self-regulating private institutions and processes or whether and
how such varieties of practices could or should be regulated in any other way
(such as in more public institutions).13
12. See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); STATE AND NON-STATE LAW, supra note 4.
13. I am no stranger to these issues having chaired a multi-year effort to craft ethical rules and standards for
the practice of “alternative” (now more commonly denominated “appropriate”) dispute resolution, including
mediation, arbitration and other hybrid processes, including the promulgation of rules and principles for both
individuals (lawyers, mediators, arbitrators, negotiators, witnesses and experts), as well as “provider’
institutions. See Center for Public Resources-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice in
ADR, Model Rule for Lawyer as Third-Party Neutral, CPR (Nov. 2002), http://www.cpradr.org/RulesCase
Services/CPRRules/ModelRulefortheLawyerasThird-PartyNeutral.aspx [http://perma.cc/D2LQ-8TU4] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015); Center for Public Resources-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of Practice
in ADR, Principles ADR Provider Organizations, CPR (May 2002), http://www.cpradr.org/RulesCaseServices/
CPRRules/PrinciplesforADRProviderOrganizations.aspx [http://perma.cc/77BF-F4JG] (last visited Dec. 19,
2015). That project, dealing primarily with domestic American issues, exposed different legal cultures within
the adversary practice of party-selected arbitrators, differences among facilitative and evaluative mediators, and
the different “cultures” of different provider organizations, e.g. CPR (non-administered ADR), American
Arbitration Association (administered arbitration seeking entry into mediation market), making elucidation of
“core” or more controversial ethical rules and standards difficult at best. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is
Mediation the Practice of Law?, 111 NAT’L INST. DISP. RESOL. NEWS, no. 2, March/April 1996, at 1; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Conflicts of Interest in Mediation Practice, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1996. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What’s Happening
and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering As Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 631 (1997).
Though some private provider organizations have adopted the CPR-Georgetown Rules and Standards (e.g.
CPR, now International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution) or their own ethical standards (e.g. the
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Ethical Rules for Commercial Arbitration); many years of efforts at
ethical rule drafting for the ABA culminated in one very simple and inadequate MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 2.4 (2015) [hereinafter MODEL RULES], Lawyer Serving as Third Party Neutral, which simply
advises that lawyers may serve as neutrals and when they do, they are not “representing” clients (so the
requirements of all the other lawyer ethical rules, e.g. conflicts of interests, etc. may not be applicable). See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Elizabeth Plapinger, Model Rules Clarify Lawyer Conduct When Serving As Neutral,
5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 20, Summer 1999. Ethical regulation of domestic mediation and arbitration remains
inadequate, complex and plural with litigation, claiming malpractice or other ethical violations. See James
Coben & Peter Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systemic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 4 HARV. NEG. L.
REV. 43, 94 (2006) (noting that parties sometimes make motions mid-litigation to disqualify attorneys). As
reviewed more thoroughly in the text, current ethical claims in international arbitration can occur in challenges
to the appointments of arbitrators at various stages in the arbitration and in court challenges for
non-enforcement or vacatur of an arbitration award according to the standards of “evident partiality, bias,
corruption, denial of notice or fair process or inconsistency with national policy,” according to the provisions of
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Professor Rogers’s valuable book seeks to propose a relatively modest, but still
controversial, call for private international and internal regulation of a specific
form of transnational legal practice—international arbitration, encompassing
primarily private commercial and hybrid state-investor investment arbitration.14
Her rigorous and detailed book, which will undoubtedly become the field’s basic
text, touches on many vaster and deeper issues of comparative law, transcultural
ethical and legal values, and standards and enforcement of basic norms of
legality, legitimacy, fairness and justice. The implications of a search for
transnational ethics in international arbitration is no less than a concern with
significant jurisprudential issues about sources of transnational law and enforcement of good, fair and moral practices for those who work in transnational legal
systems.
Whether transnational disputes are denominated private (commercial), public
or state based (diplomatic, political, treaty-based, human rights, and now even
criminal15) or hybrid (investment), the now common method of using arbitration
by party selected arbiters of contracts, treaties and other legal undertakings to
decide cases and issue awards, orders and rulings, whether voluntarily complied
with, or ultimately enforced by a nation-state,16 has created its own form of
transnational legal justice.

Art. V (and its variable interpretations in national courts) of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
14. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 13–14, 365–72.
15. With the growing number of formal international tribunals in a variety of substantive fields, international
criminal law has produced perhaps the deepest set of substantive and ethical rules of practice. See, e.g., ARMAN
SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AT THE INTERNATIONAL BAR (2013) [hereinafter SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS]. Many of the newer international and regional adjudicative tribunals, including the International Court
of Justice, the European Court of Justice, the European and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and now the International Criminal
Court have issued their own Ethical Standards or rules of practice and, in some cases, have had to rule on
particular ethical issues, often in cases with representatives from different national jurisdictions and ethical
traditions. See generally YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2014)
[hereinafter SHANY, EFFFECTIVENESS] (for treatment of the issues in judicial independence and judicial selection
in international tribunals). Outside the scope of this essay, but relevant to its concerns, are the issues of
“conflicts of laws” in application of appropriate ethics standards when foreign lawyers appear in the national
courts of another nation (or in the United States, in another state) and a tribunal must decide what ethical rules
apply to the professional activity of a lawyer appearing in a particular court. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 8.5.
Under the American choice of law rules a lawyer may be subject to ethical disciplinary action (or
disqualification rules) in more than one jurisdiction at the same time (e.g. the jurisdiction in which the attorney
is licensed and the jurisdiction in which the legal conduct is performed).
16. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (1958), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf [http://perma.cc/4QAX-XUPC]; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, (1965), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/icsid.
settlement.of.disputes.between.states.and.nationals.of.other.states.convention.washington.1965/ [http://perma.
cc/3984-2YSE]. THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
and the ICSID CONVENTION provide treaty authorization for the enforcement of international commercial and
investment arbitration awards, respectively, in the state (national) courts of the signatories to the respective
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Many argue that such processes of dispute resolution are non-transparent and
unfair or unjust for particular parties, both state and private, and should not be
supported at all (as exhibited recently in the controversies about the proposed
uses of arbitral processes in the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership and Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)).17 However, others who support the
use of arbitral processes (as based in a consensual, party controlled and efficient
regime of dispute resolution) are still concerned about its proper uses and
practices and its claims for legitimacy. They seek to encourage a more robust
debate and conversation about these important issues.18
In this Review Essay, I discuss the specific proposals Professor Rogers has
made with respect to ensuring greater legitimacy for international arbitration. She
proposes that there be more internal (by the arbitration “field”19 itself),
international (through the various international administrative and professional
institutional bodies that currently organize the field), regulation (by rule
promulgation and various forms of enforcement mechanisms) and transparency
and accountability (by her own creative organizing of an interactive website,
Arbitrator Intelligence ©, of published arbitration awards, feedback and
information on international arbitrators20). Here, I seek to situate this important
effort in a much more complex web of jurisprudential concerns about whether it
is either descriptively possible or normatively desirable to aim for international
or transnational ethical standards in law practice and legal decision-making. This
is particularly difficult when practice and decision-making crosses national and
legal cultural boundaries, and are utilized in a great variety of different subject
matter disputes.21

treaties. Over 145 countries have signed the NY Convention. Recently, some countries, notably Venezuela,
Ecuador and Bolivia have attempted to rescind and withdraw their ratification of the Washington Convention for
investment disputes, signaling some loss of international acceptability of the international investment
arbitration and whole legal regime of investment treaties, law and dispute resolution. See Kendall Grant, The
ICSID Under Siege: UNASUR and the Rise of a Hybrid Regime for International Investment Arbitration, 52
OSGOODE HALL L. J. (forthcoming 2015) (describing Ecuador’s proposal for a new parallel and alternative
investment arbitration process for Latin American countries).
17. GUS VAN HARTEN, A REPORT ON THE FLAWED PROPOSALS FOR INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(ISDS) IN TTIP AND CETA (2015), www.ssrn.com/abstract⫽2595189 [http://perma.cc/9HDX-C4DG].
18. See, e.g., Letter from Jose Alvarez et al. to Majority Leader McConnell, Minority Leader Reid, Speaker
Boehner, Minority Leader Pelosi and Ambassador Froman (Apr. 2015), https://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isdsopen-letter [https://perma.cc/WU4J-LEHJ].
19. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 805
(1987).
20. ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org [http://perma.cc/H8MB-RYDU] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2015).
21. The issues of trans- or international ethics standards are not confined to legal practice alone. THE ROLE OF
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011). Within international relations more
generally there is both academic and practical (e.g. in governmental aid and development work) concern about
whether there can or should be “ethics” with appropriate standards or rules for international actions, such as
humanitarian, financial and political aid, medical services, criminal law enforcement and even cultural
exchanges. See, e.g., ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: EXTENT AND LIMITS (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Daniel
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Ethics in International Arbitration is structured with two important and
discrete sections. First, Mapping the Terrain, which is a tour d’horizon of ethical
issues, controversies, cases, rules, authorities and conflicts that have emerged
from the modern international practice of arbitration of transnational disputes,
primarily commercial and investment disputes. Second, Staking Out Theoretical
Boundaries and Building the Regime, is a review of some of the major
jurisprudential and comparative law issues implicated in any planned regime of
international ethical standards. These two sections can be separately “consumed”—
the first section by practitioners, seeking to understand the latest controversies
and rules, rulings, decisions and case law on difficult ethical issues in
international arbitration, and the second by academics and theorists concerned
about the underpinnings of any attempted regime of transnational ordering.
In this Review, I first discuss the important theoretical and jurisprudential
issues to elaborate on how deep, complex and difficult these issues are. Like
many who come to this subject, I began in this field with my own interest in the
practical difficulties of arbitrating disputes where the players come from different
legal cultures, rules, and role expectations. These two parts of Professor Rogers’s
book, as two possible entry points into the issues, permit focusing on either the
inductive (case by case derived “rules” and standards from concrete ethical
dilemmas) or deductive (general rules and standards first, from which one reasons
to a conclusion about particular issues) methods for developing ethical rules and
standards.22
Ten years ago, while I was teaching a course on International Commercial
Arbitration in Europe (in Switzerland and at the International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC”) in Paris) with then President of the ICC, Professor Pierre
Tercier, to a group of law students from over ten different jurisdictions, we
encountered first-hand the conflicts about whether international ethics standards
and rules were desirable or even possible in international arbitration practice.23
As we focused on some of the concrete practice ethics issues raised in
Warner eds., 2001); THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999); THOMAS
CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (2006); THOMAS CAROTHERS &
DIANE DE GRAMONT, DEVELOPMENT AID CONFRONTS POLITICS: THE ALMOST REVOLUTION (2013). And in the
private sector, the modern online businesses that seek to operate in different national regulatory environments
are challenging notions of national regulation and practices (with international business and investment, as well
as professional, employment, labor and health standards, implications as well. See, e.g., Tracey Lien, Two Uber
Execs Taken into Custody in France over Possible Illegal Operations, LATIMES.COM (June 29, 2015, 12:50 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber-france-exec-20150629-story.html [http://perma.cc/
ZF4A-XKPK].
22. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We
Should (Not) Do About It: Lessons From International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 195 (2009);
KENNETH WINSTON, ETHICS IN PUBLIC LIFE: GOOD PRACTITIONERS IN A RISING ASIA (2015) (using case studies to
elaborate practical ethics and good practices and judgment in public administration).
23. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are Cross-Cultural Ethics Standards Possible or Desirable in International
´ EN L’HONNEUR DE PIERRE TERCIER (Peter Gauch et al. ed. 2008) [hereinafter
Arbitration?, in MELANGES
Menkel-Meadow, Cross-Cultural Ethics].
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international arbitration, and now reviewed in Part I of Professor Rogers’s book,
(such as witness interviewing, preparation and rehearsal, cross-examinations,
document discovery, arbitrator conflicts of interests, confidentiality, ex parte
communications, lawyer-client privilege, selection of and use of experts, fees,
costs and, more generally, litigation “manners,”) we discovered that cultural and
legal differences emerged among and between those of us (professors included)
who were educated in different common law or civil law systems, even within
similar legal “systems.”24 In the class, differences emerged in areas of very basic
practice (document discovery, witness preparation, privilege and confidentiality,
and the role of experts) to more “informal” issues of party communications (and
meals!) with arbitrators, all with potentially great impact on the conduct and
outcome of particular arbitrations.
While some of us (this author and likely Professor Rogers too) were more
sanguine about the possibility of finding some “core” or more universal ethical
precepts to guide international arbitration practice, others (including Professor
Tercier and the ICC as an institution at the time25) thought it was unlikely and
also undesirable to attempt to codify ethical guidance for a transnational practice
drawing on so many different legal cultures and traditions.26 In this view, “ethics”
(as well as etiquette, manners and routines of practice) are so internal to the
structure of different legal systems and cultures that a “transnational,” universal
or core set of principles of good practice is virtually impossible to create,
implement, and enforce. In addition, at the instrumental level, those who oppose
the development of increased ethical regulation are concerned that complaints,
grievances, and claims of unethical behavior will complicate and hinder the
promise of expeditious and efficient case processing, which arbitration claims to
deliver.27 Those, like Professor Rogers and myself, who aim to establish some
standards of international “ethical” practice, argue that the legitimacy of
international arbitration is at stake. At the instrumental level, our argument is that
without such standards, increasing numbers of challenges to international
arbitration awards in an ever growing number of venues, including international,
regional and national (and in the United States and other federal systems state)

24. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2014) (on “families” of legal systems where
“common law” and “civil law” systems still have many differences in both formal law and practices, both
between systems and among them, notably discovery rules differences in the United States and United
Kingdom).
25. Unlike other international arbitration institutions, which had begun to promulgate ethics standards, the
ICC was quite resistant to the development of ethics principles until quite recently. See THE INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, www.icc.org [http://perma.cc/2QPZ-NUHP] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). See
Menkel-Meadow, Cross-Cultural Ethics, supra note 23.
26. See Robert W. Wachter, Ethical Standards in International Arbitration: Considering Solutions to Level
the Playing Field, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1143 (2011).
27. As some concrete evidence of this, challenges to arbitrators have increased a great deal in recent years;
the ICC had thirty-seven challenges to arbitrators in 2004 but reported fifty-seven challenges in 2009. See
Nottage, Transnational Commercial Arbitration, supra note 2, at 3.
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courts will also impede the expeditious and fair enforcement of international
arbitral awards.28 Others argue that promulgation of ethics standards might
actually increase the numbers of ethics challenges and reduce the promised
efficiency of international arbitration.29
Although issues of ethics in international arbitration began with a focus on
international (private) commercial arbitration, which continues to constitute an
overwhelming majority of international arbitrations,30 recent attention to the
controversial aspects of investment (investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”))
arbitration and increasing demands for transparency and accountability in such
public policy affecting rulings31 has resulted in increased attention to ethics and
standards in all forms of arbitral decision-making.32 Further complicating the
question of specifying ethical standards in international arbitration are the variety
of roles within the arbitral process that might be affected by such efforts. This
includes the practices and behaviors of representatives-advocates, arbitrators
(including party-appointed, neutrals, chairs of panels), experts, witnesses, parties
(including both private and public entities and individuals33), and now, third-

28. Despite the fact that generally speaking, arbitration awards are not “appealable” and are considered
“final” if they meet the requirements of the NY Convention, international arbitrations awards are in fact
challenged or “appealed” at various stages, including at the beginning or during, often in the “seat” (or locale) of
the arbitration, or more commonly in proceedings in national courts to enforce or vacate an arbitral award under
Art. V of the NY Convention. See, e.g., Christopher Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in
Transnational Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights from the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 WORLD ARB. & MED.
REV. 39, 53–55 (2009).
29. See Nottage, Transnational Commercial Arbitration, supra note 2; Park, Fair Fight, supra note 7; JAN
PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013) [hereinafter PAULSSON, IDEA].
30. A 2008 study by Queen Mary University of London School of International Arbitration (with
PriceWaterhouseCoopers) found that states were involved in only five percent of the total arbitration market.
See GERRY LAGERBERG & LOUKAS MISTELIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND
PRACTICES (2008), http://www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4JXX-WXJV] (though that figure is likely higher now, with increased investment arbitration from
both Argentina’s particular investment defaults and investment arbitrations following on from the economic
downturn of 2008, likely contributing to higher caseloads in the investment area).
31. See, e.g., M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(2015).
32. In the United States, issues of fairness and transparency in private dispute resolution—and now Supreme
Court-approved mandatory arbitration in commercial, consumer and employment disputes—have also fueled
the debate, sometimes conflating domestic and international issues, but also raising concerns about whether
there are essential common values in dispute resolution with third-party decision-makers, whether public or
private. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in the
Courts and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing]; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of America: From the Formal to the
Informal to the “Semi-Formal,” in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE
CROSSROADS (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013).
33. It is common to think of international arbitration as involving disputes only between legal persons (large
companies, states, governmental and non-governmental organizations), but international arbitration also now
includes disputes involving natural persons, as multi-national and international organizations now have
docketed employment disputes in many of the international arbitral institutions.
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party funders and investors in the litigation.34
As discussed more fully below,35 arbitration is governed by its own form of
legal pluralism36—the contract (supported by international treaty) and then party
chosen procedural rules. By specifying the use of arbitration in a transborder
contract, dispute resolution is removed from formal court or other institutional
adjudication (until, perhaps, if a challenge is later leveled, at the enforcement of
the award stage). The conduct of any arbitration hearing is therefore governed by
any rules or procedures specified in contractual terms, between the parties, and/or
by procedural rules provided by the chosen arbitration institution (such as the
ICC, the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Centre for
International Dispute Resolution (“CIDR,” the American Arbitration Association’s international arm), or any other chosen rules (e.g. United Nations
Committee on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Rules of Arbitration) or any ad hoc agreed to procedural rules.37 All of these rules, which may
provide explicit or implicit “ethical” practice standards, unfortunately have little
provision for enforcement by either arbitral administering institutions or

34. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 177–217 (2014); William Park & Catherine Rogers, Third Party Funding in
International Arbitration: The ICCA Queen Mary Task Force, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (Gerold Zeiler et al., eds., 2015). See also Jonathan Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution
to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L. J. 65 (2010); Mark Kantor, Third Party Funding in International
Arbitration An Essay About New Developments, 24 ICSID REV. 65 (2009).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 43–67.
36. To clarify terms for this review, arbitral “institutions” are the international administrative, nongovernmental organizations that manage, “host,” or facilitate arbitrations (e.g., the ICC, the London Court of
International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Centre for International Dispute Resolution (“CIDR”), China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (“CIETAC”) etc.). For a list of arbitral institutions
and further discussion of the meaning of the term “arbitral institution,” see Rémy Gerbay, The Functions of
Arbitral Institutions: Theoretical Representations and Practical Realities (Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Queen Mary, University of London), https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/8143/1/Gerbay%
2c%20Rémy%20181214.pdf [http://perma.cc/LN3Y-BRCQ]). Arbitral “panels” are the constituted decisionmakers (usually comprising three arbitrators). The term “arbitration tribunal” is often confusingly applied to
both of these very different bodies. The arbitral “institutions” administer the arbitration, can appoint arbitrators
where parties so specify (and in the case of the ICC actually provide some review of the award before it is made
final) but it is the arbitration “panel” that actually conducts the arbitration, makes awards and interim measures,
and issues decisions and opinions where so authorized by the arbitration contract and rules. For general
information about all issues in international arbitration, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015) [hereinafter BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION].
37. See, e.g., BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 36; G.A. Res. 65/22, UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules (as revised in 2010) (Dec. 6, 2010); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION
(2012); INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES)
(2014); LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES (2014); INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2013); INTERNATIONAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014); AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES (2004); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2010); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR ADMINISTERED
ARBITRATION RULES (2014).
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particular arbitral panels or tribunals.38 The line dividing procedural and practice
rules from so-called “ethical” rules is fuzzy and murky in arbitration, as it can
also be in formal adjudication.39 Challenges to arbitrators might be made at the
beginning of a case to the arbitral administering institution, or to a court in the
“seat” of the arbitration. Challenges also are made at the end (challenging
enforcement of an arbitral award under several grounds of the New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards40).
However, there is little to no place for ethical complaint or challenge in the
middle of a case (except to the arbitration panel, which may or may not think it
has the authority to rule on ethical issues during the conduct of a substantive
case).41
In the last few decades, several organizations have drafted non-compulsory
(because there is no formal enforcement mechanism) ethical standards for
international arbitration, particularly, but not exclusively, in relation to issues of
possible conflicts of interest of arbitrators and more recently for “attorney
misconduct” in international practice.42 Professor Rogers’s earlier work as a
scholar in this area has been highly influential in the discussion and drafting of
such standards.43 In addition to the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on

38. Much of the increasing complexity of ethical regulation in international arbitration is canvassed in Part 1 of
Professor Rogers’s book. Some arbitral panels have justified ethical rulings and sanctions (e.g. reduction of fees, cost
awards, and disqualifications) by claiming either explicit powers (through contract or tribunal rules) or inherent powers
to preside over enforceable arbitration awards. See Margaret L. Moses, The Inherent Powers of Arbitrators to Deal with
Ethical Issues, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2014 (Arthur W. Rovine ed.,
2014). Most arbitral institutions provide some form of early challenge procedure for parties to raise arbitrators’ conflicts
of interest or other disqualifying circumstances, but there are virtually no appeals and little publicity for these cases,
unless they become the subject of a post-award challenge under Article V of the New York Convention. For further
discussion, see Chapters 2, 3, and 8 of ROGERS, supra note 1.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, for example, holds lawyers “responsible” for the veracity of the pleadings they draft
and file. The American discovery rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37, provide requirements for disclosures,
verifications and duties to update facts and information provided to the other side, with the possibility of
disciplinary sanctions being awarded by presiding judges.
40. UNCITRAL, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V (June
10, 1958).
41. Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrators Without Powers? Disqualifying Counsel in Arbitral Proceedings, 30 ARB. INT’L 457,
482–83 (2014). Of course, this issue also occurs in American domestic litigation where judges do decide some
disqualification motions during the conduct of the case, but many others deem ethical or disciplinary matters to be
outside of the scope of substantive judicial treatment and refer such matters to the appropriate disciplinary body.
American ethical case law has both traditions of common law rulings on disqualification motions as well as refusals to
deal with ethical issues within the confines of a substantive case. See, e.g., LISA LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 643–728 (3d ed. 2012).
42. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES ON PARTY REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION (2013); INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS & TRIBUNALS (2010) [hereinafter HAGUE PRINCIPLES].
43. See, e.g., Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International
Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53 (2005);
Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005).
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Conflicts of Interests for International Arbitrators,44 several of the international
arbitral institutions that have now promulgated their own rules or ethical
guidelines (e.g., International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution
(“CPR”), LCIA, the ICC and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)), have been urged to promulgate such standards.45 Even the ICC, the institution that most resisted development of ethical
guidelines because of objections reviewed here, has now contemplated its own
process of ethical guideline development. This may be a reaction to the claims
that the arbitral institutions are engaged in a competition over the delivery of
dispute resolution services and ethical standards are one of the distinguishing
features of the competition.46
Finally, when and if parties seek enforcement, non-recognition, vacatur, or
annulment of an arbitral award under the New York Convention, national courts
may rule on challenges to the award, implicating ethical issues, such as “evident
partiality,” or “corruption or bias” of the arbitrator or other grounds for
non-recognition under the treaty47 and its applicable case law. Thus, those who
may be asked to rule or opine on ethical issues include arbitration institutions,
panels of or individual arbitrators, national courts, some international tribunals
(ICSID), the World Trade Organization (WTO), formal governmental disciplinary bodies (national or state in the case of federal countries), non-governmental
professional associations (e.g. International Bar Association) and other international or transnational bodies, or domestic bar associations and disciplinary
bodies, and even private law firms or other practice units.48

44. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES

ON

CONFLICTS

OF INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRA-

TION (2014), www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx [http://perma.cc/

AG7T-6PXZ].
45. See ROGERS, supra note 1; Menkel-Meadow, Cross-Cultural Ethics, supra note 23, at 884–89.
46. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Fussing about the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes in a
Professional Competition, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 285 (1996); Bryant Garth, Privatization and the New Market
for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12 STUD. L. POLS. & SOC’Y 367 (1992).
47. Grounds for non-recognition of international (or “foreign”) arbitral awards are found in Article V of the
treaty and are interpreted by the relevant national courts, which can include the “seat” of the arbitration, the
country in which enforcement is sought or the country in which the arbitration has actually taken place. See
Born, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 36.
48. In one of the major conflict of interest cases reported in the international investment field, the tribunal
had to rule on the challenge of a respondent represented by a member of a British barrister’s chambers of which
the tribunal president was also a member. See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/24, Tribunal’s Ruling regarding the participation of David Mildon QC in further stages of the
proceedings (May, 6 2008), 24 ICSID REV. 201 (2009) (ruling that representative, not arbitrator should be
excluded); see also Rompetrol Group NV v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision of the Tribunal on the
Participation of Counsel (Jan. 14, 2010), 24 ICSID REV. 232 (2010) (rejecting respondent’s objection that
claimant’s counsel and arbitrator had been members of the same firm and ruling that, as representative joined
proceedings after arbitrator was chosen, arbitrator had no duty to disclose any possible conflict). These cases
highlight the difference between conflict rules in the U.K. (where members of barristers’ chambers are
independent employees, not “partners” with parity of information and income) and the U.S., the ethics rules of
which impute information and income sharing between all members of a firm. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 1.8–1.13.
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Thus, any regime of international arbitration ethics is likely to be “plural,” both
in substantive content (different legal regimes and different subject matter
disputes) and in the bodies or institutions that may ultimately rule on whether
some ethical standard, rule or guideline has been transgressed. Despite the likely
pluralism of content, interpretation and enforcement, Professor Rogers still
proposes that we can and should have “ethics in international arbitration.” Now,
let us consider how she proposes we might actually do this.

I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS FOR ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. ARBITRATION’S SOURCE IN TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Perhaps one of the most interesting and contested topics in modern international jurisprudence is whether international arbitration has its own jurisprudential justification or raison d’être.49 This section situates Professor Rogers’s
consideration of ethical standards for international arbitration in the larger
context of the jurisprudential justification for a legal dispute system that is not
tethered to any national or territorial legal system, or even to a single
international tribunal. By urging the international arbitration community to adopt
ethical standards, Professor Rogers must confront the question of what legal
regime can or should have authority over participants in the international
arbitration process—what level of law and legal institution can or should regulate
the ethical conduct of those engaged in international arbitral processes.50
Scholars and practitioners have debated for decades whether international arbitration
has its own “transnational” locus, bearing no real contact with any particular
nation-state or territory, thought to be required to justify the establishment of a legal
regime.51 The argument is that international arbitration is rooted in either the
international “common law” of contract, its transnational substantive law of lex
mercatoria,52 or has its legal authority rooted in the “positive law” enactment and
ratification by over 145 countries of the United Nations New York Convention for the

Thus, law practice units with international arbitration and litigation practices may also have to consider ethical
issues that may arise as challenges or disputes within proceedings where counsel participate in a variety of
different roles, including arbitrator, counsel-representative or even expert witness (in many international
proceedings, foreign law is presented through expert testimony of lawyers from a particular jurisdiction).
49. For recent efforts to articulate legal and jurisprudential theories of justification for the regime of
international arbitration, see PAULSSON, IDEA supra note 29 and EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010).
50. And should international arbitral processes be governed, if at all, differently, from those who participate
in other international litigation and tribunals. See SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15; SHANY,
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 15; see also infra note 110.
51. This is the positivist approach to territorial, formal and legitimate law making. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
52. LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed., 1998).
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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). This in turn
authorizes national courts to enforce and recognize (or vacate and not enforce) arbitral
awards. Perhaps the image most appropriate for international arbitration’s jurisprudence may be the globe balanced on the back of elephants and/or turtles “all the way
down,” a multi-cultural, infinite regress creation myth53:

IMAGE 1: Turtles All the Way Down.
Whether international arbitration is sourced in contract (turtles?), or positive
law by treaty or state court enforcement (elephants?), it has at least this dualistic
essence. In Professor Rogers’s clever chapter headings international arbitrators
are seen as either ducks (contract service providers) or rabbits (private
adjudicators), but are often considered not to be both at the same time.54 Do you
see a rabbit or a duck in the picture below?
In fact, my view, and ultimately Professor Rogers’s view too,55 follows that of
international arbitrator and scholar Gary Born. Born states that “arbitrators’
53. See Turtles All the Way Down, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down [https://perma.
cc/GG5V-YCZ7] (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). The “creation myth” story of the beginning of the earth, balanced on the
back of turtles is attributed to Hindu, Chinese and American Indian stories of how the earth came to be, with varying
tales of how the earth was formed and how it sustains itself, when we cannot fully “know” how it all began. In the Hindu
version the globe rests on an elephant that rests on the “world” turtle. This image may be more apt as it expresses the
duality of international arbitration as being supported by both contract and treaty/positive law/state action theories and so
is dependent on both elephants and turtles. There is a little more written history to the beginning of international
arbitration. See e.g., DEREK ROEBUCK & BRUNO DE LOYNES DE FUMICHON, ROMAN ARBITRATION (2004); DEREK
ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(2013); DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION (2015).
54. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 343 (“Duck-Rabbits, A Panel of Monkeys, and the Status of International
Arbitrators”).
55. Id. at 349.
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IMAGE 2: Duck-Rabbits.
status, rights and obligations are the result of a contract which operates within,
and incorporates, a specialized legal regime—that regime being the international
and national law framework governing the international arbitral process.”56
International arbitration is sui generis—it is a thing unto itself, both constituting
and being constituted by the transnational legal order of transnational contracts,
international treaties and national court enforcement and interpretation.
Notice here I have used the term “transnational”57—not “international.” In my
view, arbitration is a dispute resolution process that can be used both “inter-state”
(in disputes among and between nation states) and among and between entities,
states, and individuals, from different nation states, and can involve the
application of law that is not tethered to a particular territory. The parties may
create or choose their own procedural rules for the conduct of the arbitration, and
often may also choose substantive rules to govern their “contractual” relations
that are not necessarily tied to their own particular nations. With the ever
expanding number of formal state treaties and legal undertakings, as well as less
formal “global administrative” or “global governance” agreements,58 at both
state and private levels, (including sub-national compacts or “transnational”
groups such as religions, ethnicities, etc.59), the “transnational legal order” is
pluralistic, multi-layered and organized in many different ways. This includes the
56. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2022 (2014).
57. Philip Jessup coined the term “transnational law” in his 1956 Storrs Lecture. Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 186 (1996). The term encompasses “all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers” including “public and private international law” and “other
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
58. SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD, supra note 4.
59. For the important argument that globalization occurs often at sub-national as well as transnational levels,
see generally WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(2009); STATE AND NON-STATE LAW, supra note 4.
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turtles and elephants or ducks and rabbits of formal state law, both statutory and
decisional; international treaty law, less formal international administrative
governance, including private arbitral administrative institutions and private, but
cross-border contractual promises.
While many argue that as long as a state may be required ultimately to
“enforce” arbitral awards (where there is a contest or challenge to them),
international arbitration is ultimately grounded in formal and state-made law
through interpretations of the NY Convention by national courts.60 Professor
Rogers’s view (which is mine as well) is that international arbitration, as it
currently operates in a legal realist sense, is sufficiently self-constituted and its
ethical regime must be responsive to its own particular constitutive elements. To
put it more simply, an arbitrator is both more and less than a public state
sanctioned “judge,” if what is meant by being a judge is adjudicating in a state or
international court of law, subject to formal state appointment and public law
regimes. Arbitrators are often “closer” to the parties and usually have more
expertise with respect to the matters they are hearing than judges. Arbitrators are
not randomly selected. They are chosen by the parties for particular matters and
may be “chosen” again. This causes them to owe different, and in some respects,
greater duties, to the parties than more formally appointed judges of the public
legal system.61 What the sources of those duties are depends on where
international arbitration derives its own legal authority.
Competing theories of the sources of arbitration include the “territorial” model
(monolocal or national state law, whether of the “seat” of arbitration62 or
enforcing state), the “pluralist” model (including all of the nation states whose
laws may impact or have an effect on the hearing, completion and enforcement of
an arbitral award and which are governed by both treaty law and national law),
and most controversially, the “autonomous” model (seeing international arbitration as generating and being supported by its own international/transnational

60. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31 (2010); Simon
Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1, 18 (2005).
61. At the domestic level in the United States, there remains a controversial and ongoing discussion of
whether public judges deliver more justice than private dispute resolvers. See Resnik, Diffusing, supra note 32;
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985). Others argue that it is precisely because the parties have chosen
them that arbitrators have more legitimacy and power than “distant and impersonal” judges. See PAULSSON,
IDEA, supra note 29. What ethical duties are owed by judges (at different levels of court) also remains
controversial and variable by legal culture. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge
Disqualification, 62 N. Y. U. L. REV. 237 (1987); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrick, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
62. The physical location of the arbitration itself, though even here parties may designate a legal “seat” and
then decide to hold some or all of the arbitration hearings in some other location.
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jurisdictional, substantive and procedural principles).63 These competing theories
of arbitral jurisprudence reflect both philosophical and practical debates and
issues.
To further complicate the debates in traditional legal or jurisprudential terms,
modern arbitration theorists64 (among whom I include legal scholars Professor
Rogers and myself) and legal sociologists Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth,65
suggest that not all dispute resolution regimes must in fact, tether themselves to a
formal legal system of justification at all. In law and society terms, “legal
pluralism” has long acknowledged that multiple systems of dispute resolution,
whether from formal law or communitarian or industry-wide66 or other “rules” or
“customs,” may co-exist at different levels of a society (e.g. “native” and
“colonial” rules and processes) and may be legitimated by non-formal legal
principles and legal institutions.67
In recent decades the “alternative” or “appropriate” dispute resolution
movement, in theory and practice,68 has argued for, described, and implemented
a variety of dispute resolution processes designed to solve people’s problems and
resolve or at least “handle” their disputes without necessary recourse to courts,
even if law may often structure or affect possible resolutions.69 Consensual party
dispute resolution (with or without third-party facilitation in negotiation or
mediation, or decision in arbitration) has its own justificatory or legitimating

63. Though this last theory is most often attributed to EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2008), it is now often criticized as a “French view” or based on French law. See
PAULSSON, IDEA, supra note 29, at 42–43 (quoting the ruling of Judge Rix of the Court of Appeals of England
and Wales in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of
Pakistan, [2009] EWCA Civ. 755 on whether the arbitrators had the “power” to decide under “those
transnational general principles and usages which reflect the fundamental requirements of justice in
international trade” whether the government of Pakistan could be “forced” to be a party to an arbitration after
renouncing an earlier contractual commitment to arbitrate). In parallel cases, the UK court held that there was
no such “power” while the French courts held there was.
64. PAULSSON, IDEA, supra note 29.
65. DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 2.
66. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963)
(discussing specific dispute resolution mechanisms in particular business contexts, outside of formal litigation).
For a history of American developments of non-legal or “extra-legal” forms of dispute resolution, see JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS (1983).
67. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988); Sally Falk Moore,
Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 719, 720 (1973); see also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
68. See generally CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL (2d ed. 2011).
69. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE L. J. 950,
988 n.124 (1979).
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principles.70 Legal theorists, arbitrators, and law and economics scholars call this
form of legitimation “freedom of contract” or market,71 rather than state forms of
dispute resolution, with a different theory of legitimacy.72 More progressive or
legal process theorists see the legitimating principles for these forms of dispute
resolution in party consent, functionalism, “institutional or process competence”
or simply “process pluralism,” where one size or process will not fit all needs for
effective dispute resolution.73
International arbitration, like other consensual forms of dispute resolution,
may be a predominantly private form of dispute resolution, which is often desired
by the parties, but now often criticized by those outside of the dispute itself,
leading to modern demands for greater public accountability.74 Thus, the
jurisprudence of international arbitration, like other forms of non-court dispute
resolution, is complicated by whether justification and legitimacy is sought for
the parties in the dispute or those outside the dispute (such as the general public),
who might be affected by whatever happens in a private dispute. These
individuals may be affected in any number of ways, including external effects,
informal precedent setting, resource diminishment, or some other impact on
those outside of the dispute (e.g. employees of a company, citizens of an
invested-in nation, children of a divorce or future generations in an environmental dispute). The level or unit of analysis for legal legitimacy, justification or
jurisprudence is itself plural.75
International arbitration’s complex form and structure—being at the same time
mostly consensual (contractual); multi-jurisdictional (touching on different legal
systems for laws of formation, procedure, interpretation, enforcement); private
(in rules, choice of decision makers, and in conduct of hearings and pronouncement of awards and outcomes); and self-regulating or insular demarks it as

70. See LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I.
Winston ed., 1981) [hereinafter FULLER, PRINCIPLES] (containing essays with philosophical justifications for the
different processes of adjudication, arbitration, mediation and other processes); see also Menkel-Meadow,
Peace and Justice, supra note 11.
71. See generally PAULSSON, IDEA, supra note 29, at 2–4; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(9th ed. 2014).
72. Critics of course claim that even consensual dispute resolution rests on the backs of the elephants of the
state: contract breaches, including those stemming from mediation, negotiation, and arbitration may ultimately
have to turn to courts for enforcement or remediation. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a
State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1997).
73. See FULLER, PRINCIPLES, supra note 70; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The
Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 25–30 (2000); Menkel-Meadow, Peace and
Justice, supra note 11.
74. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing, supra note 32, at 2920; see generally SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY,
RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006) (criticizing the growth, from early middle ages to
modern times, of privatizing guild arbitration that enhances “private authority” including multi-national, and
therefore ungovernable by states, corporations and other “transnational” bodies operating without public
accountability).
75. See Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 11.
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different from public legal institutions. Many other dispute resolution processes
are also not public. These include modern transnational mediation, most
diplomatic negotiations,76 and other hybrid and informal forms of dispute
resolution (“good offices,” informal inquiries, etc.).77 At the same time, in the
modern world the expansion of international public tribunals, following the
atrocities of World War II and many civil wars, military dictatorships, genocides
and multi-national anti-terrorism efforts, has increased our expectations and
demands for public accountability in a variety of new forms of adjudication.78
The parallel growth of many new sites for dispute resolution, especially with the
potential of effects and consequences for many other people, beyond the
particular disputants (in civil, criminal, commercial and other kinds of disputes)
has often led to the demand for greater accountability, publicity and ethical
requirements for those who work in those sites and systems.79 The question
remains for internationalists, ethicists, and dispute resolvers whether all processes require the same or different governing and ethical principles. In legal
process terms, does each form of dispute resolution require or generate its own
form of “institutional or ethical competence?”80
B. MAKING TRANSNATIONAL ETHICS RULES AND STANDARDS:
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

Just as the initial framers of our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to
develop “trans-substantive” procedural rules for all types of civil cases,81 the
drafters of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct
have sought for decades to provide a universal set of ethical norms for all kinds of
lawyers.82 More recently, the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT (in
Europe) have attempted to craft a transnational set of civil procedure rules.83

76. J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1-25 (5th ed. 2011).
77. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2006) at 53-77;
79-101; JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, HAROLD ABRAMSON & PAT K. CHEW, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
CONSENSUAL ADR PROCESSES (2005).
78. See SHANY, EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 15.
79. See SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15.
80. FULLER, PRINCIPLES, supra note 70; see also Menkel-Meadow, Mothers, supra note 73.
81. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2047 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
377, 379 (2010).
82. MODEL RULES. This comes with a few notable exceptions, such as in the recognition of particular ethical
requirements for prosecutors, MODEL RULES R. 3.8 (to seek justice and turn over exculpatory information to
criminal defense lawyers), and special duties for lawyers representing organizations, MODEL RULES R. 1.13.
83. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (2004).
UNIDROIT and other bodies have also attempted codification of more uniform or harmonizing rules of
substantive law too, as in regional (European) or even international rules for contract formation and
interpretation. See, e.g., UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004); STUDY
GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & THE RESEARCH GROUP ON EC PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT FRAME OF REFERENCE
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Those seeking to consider or impose ethical standards or guidelines on
international dispute resolvers, like arbitrators (or mediators), have to confront
the question of whether one size will fit all. For many years, as a domestic legal
ethicist, I argued against totally uniform rules for different kinds of practitioners.84 I suggest, as Professor Rogers has here,85 with respect to international
arbitrators, that we do better by matching ethics to function, so that the greater
specifics of particular roles can be addressed in a more tailored and appropriate
fashion and can provide more detailed guidelines for behavior than a more
abstract, if universal, set of aspirational norms.86
Applying a functional approach to the development of ethical standards in
international arbitration, as Professor Rogers has done, raises issues of the levels
of functionality to be addressed. As Professor Rogers’s duck and rabbit images
and metaphors suggest that international arbitrators are seen as either adjudicators (with the possibility of judicial ethics being applied to them in that role) or
contract service providers (with a contractual, disclose and consent ethic
administered by the arbitrators, parties and their administering institutions), the
ethics of the arbitrators themselves is only one function to be considered.87 To the
extent that international arbitration is now frequently used not only in private
commercial disputes, but also in more public or hybrid investment, trade and
even state-to-state and citizen-to-citizen disputes (e.g. Israel-Lebanon,88 the
US-Iran Claims Tribunal,89 and the UN Iran-Iraq Claims Tribunal90), the function
of arbitration itself at a systemic level is also relevant to the framing of ethical
standards and guidelines. Thus, the jurisprudential basis of international arbitration ethics is plural—claims of legitimacy, acceptability and justice must be
satisfied at both individual (party and arbitrator) levels and systemic levels at the
same time. And, adding to the unit of analysis challenges, the complexity of
multi-cultural legal systems, comparative law and conflicts of laws questions,
Professor Rogers has set herself a difficult set of challenges indeed.
There can be no doubt, however, that whatever the jurisprudential, choice of
law, comparative law or multicultural legal system challenges presented here,
Professor Rogers has greatly clarified, explicated and mapped the terrain to move

FOR EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-private-law_en.pdf [http://perma.
cc/MS79-C79E] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
84. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the
Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE (Deborah Rhode ed., 2000).
85. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 274–310 (Chapter 7).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 177–217 (third-party funders); 99–138 (attorney representatives); 139–76 (experts and witnesses).
88. See generally GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES
190–241 (2007).
89. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation
Commission, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 171, 174–76 (2009).
90. Id. at 171.
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us forward in consideration of clearer ethical standards and practices for
transnational arbitration. In the following sections I will review her specific
contributions to this ongoing effort, focusing on some of the specific ethical and
functional dilemmas that exist. I will then suggest some concerns or further
questions to be considered in what I regard to be an important and continuing
effort to deal with these complex set of problems.

II. CONTRIBUTIONS FOR A PROGRAM OF ETHICAL “SELF-REGULATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION COMMUNITY”
Professor Rogers’s book Ethics in International Arbitration will likely be the
“go to” resource for ethical issues in international arbitration for many years to
come for several reasons. Aside from her own very important proposals to create
a system of international professional self-regulation through a variety of
institutional and other methods, this book is a valuable compendium of research
and detail of reports of the leading ethical issues, cases, tribunal rules, and
controversies in a wide variety of international arbitration settings.
The book’s organization is valuably user friendly by using the more European
method of treatise writing—every paragraph in the book is numbered by chapter
and paragraph number, making location of particular issues, rules, cases, and
scholarly sources easy to find, as well as logically developed. Each paragraph
follows from the one preceding and leads to the one following. This organization
makes both the factual material and more scholarly and argumentative material
easy to find, consider, and react to. Stylistically, this book could serve as a model
for many other scholarly books that, like this one, attempt to combine case law,
policy discussion, and factual and didactic materials with analysis, review of
competing views and presentation of different scholarly positions and proposals.
American scholars should take heed of the more common format of comparative
legal scholarship. In addition, Professor Rogers’s catchy chapter titles, using
antinomies of concepts, metaphors and images, introduce well the concerns and
controversial issues of each of her chapters, e.g., “Arbitrators, Barbers and
Taxidermists,”91 “Attorneys, Barbarians and Guerrillas,”92 “Gamblers, Loan
Sharks and Third-party Funders,”93 “Chanticleer, the Fox and Self-regulation,”94
“Duck-Rabbits, a Panel of Monkeys and the Status of International Arbitrators,”95 and finally, “Castles in the Air and the Future of International
Arbitration.”96 From this lively list of characters, Professor Rogers reviews and

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

ROGERS, supra note 1, at 57–98 (Chapter 2).
Id. at 99–138 (Chapter 3).
Id. at 177–217 (Chapter 5).
Id. at 221–73 (Chapter 6).
See id. at 343–44.
See id. at 365.
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discusses such issues as selection of arbitrators, conflicts of interests for both
arbitrators and representatives, diversification of the practice, roles of experts,
practices of document discovery, witness preparation, confidentiality and professional privilege norms, rules of evidence and procedure, newer issues of third
party funding and investment in arbitration, and other uses of arbitration
processes. She explores the issues in locating the appropriate venues for ethical
regulation—national courts, professional associations, disciplinary bodies, or the
many international administrative institutions that manage most of modern
international arbitration.97 With this vast and incredibility interesting but
complex set of issues, Professor Rogers makes it easy to find the relevant
materials, understand who has argued what, who is regulating or deciding what
issues, and what possibilities remain for future confusion or clarification.
This book provides good material for a specialist who seeks to see how
different jurisdictions or venues have dealt with the various issues described
above. There is also ample information for a generalist who is curious to know
more about the comparative ethics issues of how different legal cultures resolve
such issues in transnational settings, with no clear appellate or “uniform”98
authority. Professor Rogers has given us a deep and rich description, explication
and documentation of the current world of international arbitration, with its
history, the variations of institutions and tribunals that facilitate it, the modern
growth and diversification of the field,99 both in the types of matters that are
arbitrated and the participants in the process (Chapter 1). She provides an
excellent review and summary of the current ethical rules of a variety of
international institutions including the International Bar Association (Guidelines
for Conflicts of Interests and Presentation of Rules of Evidence), the Council of
Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) (declaration of general principles of
ethical conduct for European lawyers100), American Arbitration Association
(International Center for Dispute Resolution-ICDR), CPR-Georgetown Model
Rules for Lawyer as Third-party Neutral and Provider Principles; and the London
97. See id. at 17–18.
98. Very few of us in this field would ever speak of “uniformity” of arbitral rules or practice, but some
leading practitioners and scholars have argued that international arbitration does have the promise of creating a
“uniformity” of international dispute resolution practices and protocols, which at its most aspirational (or
pretentious) could be called a “uniform” system of private international justice. See e.g., Jan Paulsson, The
Alexander Lecture at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Universal Arbitration–What We Gain, What We
Lose (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/jan_Paulsson_Universal_A
rbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5TL-TGBF]; ADR, ARBITRATION, AND MEDIATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS (Julio César Betancourt & Jason A. Crook, eds. 2014).
99. For another recent study of the increasing diversification of the field, see Susan D. Franck, James Freda,
Kellen Lavin, Tobias A. Lehmann & Anne van Aaken, International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision and
Justice LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, 2–3 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id⫽2611174 [http://perma.cc/Z8KH-PP7X]; Susan D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias
A. Lehmann & Anne Van Aaken, The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International
Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 434 (2015).
100. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 33–34.
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Court of International Arbitration.101 She also reviews the efforts and failures of
other international groups to promulgate ethical rules or standards to deal with
such issues as arbitrator and attorney conflicts of interest, such as the ICC. She
notes that many of the newer international tribunals in Singapore, China, Cairo,
and more regional centers have developed standards to compete with the older
institutions.102
Descriptions of efforts to promulgate standards in international arbitration are
located in Chapter 1 where Professor Rogers discusses the ethical issues in other
forms of transnational practice in “foreign,” courts103 and the ethical standards
which have been promulgated for the newer international courts, such as the
Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals.104 International legal ethics thus includes the
complexity of ethical issues arising from lawyers practicing outside of their own
national (or regulatory) territories, in the courts of another nation, in international
and regional courts (e.g., European Court of Justice and European Court of
Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights), international arbitral
panels and now international mediation.105 It also includes the ethics issues of
transactional work in international or “global” law firms,106 or sites of international global administrative governance. The terrain of international legal ethics
is layered, complex, context-dependent, and also given to infinite regresses, as
multiple jurisdictions, legal institutions, and sources of rules may have an interest
in ethical standard development and enforcement.

101. See supra note 37.
102. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 45–49.
103. See Andrew Boon & John Flood, Globalization of Professional Ethics? The Significance of Lawyers’
International Codes of Conduct, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 29, 30 (1999); H. W. Arthurs, A Global Code of Legal Ethics
for the Transnational Legal Field, 2 LEGAL ETHICS 59, 60 (1999); Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
European Community Legal Ethics Code Part I: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 4 (1994); Richard L. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 752–755
(1994); David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal
´
´
Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 418 (1994); GRAINNE
DE BURCA,
CLAIRE KILPATRICK & JOANNE SCOTT, CRITICAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: LIBER AMICORUM
DAVID TRUBEK (2014).
104. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 38–43; Arman Sarvarian, Common Ethical Standards for Counsel Before
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 991, 1013–14
(2012); SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15.
105. See Council Directive 2008/52/EC, The European Directive on Cross-Border Mediation (May 8, 2008);
International Mediation Institute, IMI CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, https://imimediation.org/imi-code-ofprofessional-conduct [http://perma.cc/Y7PG-VQQ4] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); see generally, STEFFEK ET AL.,
REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (2013) (describing
international, European and regional proposals for ethics standards).
106. See Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 43 INT’L LAW 943, 957–61 (2010); see
generally, Carole Silver, Nicole De Bruin Phelan, & Mikaela Rabinowitz, Between Diffusion and Distinctiveness in Globalization: US Law Firms Go Glocal, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431 (2009) (for a study analyzing
how globalization affects U.S.-based global law firms).
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Professor Rogers also provides some excellent “thick descriptions” in the
anthropologic sense107 of a few case studies of both national (Singapore, Chile,
India, China, and US) and international (international arbitration institutions,
panels, professional associations) specific efforts to deal with an array of specific
ethical issues. These case studies focus on issues such as privilege, document
production, witness preparation and efforts to write rules, and standards to both
attract and discourage the use of international arbitration.108 She introduces the
important issues of comparative law and ethics that are inherent in any discussion
of these issues by also addressing the demographics of international law work,
including the increasing number of women, third-world parties, lawyers and
arbitrators, and the growing number of legal practitioners who have been trained
in multiple jurisdictions.109 By doing so, she demonstrates how practice,
substantive rules, and legal ethics must be considered from an increasingly
broader scope and a greater number of sources. The days of the “grand old men”
may be slowly evaporating, but so also may be the more recent domination of the
Anglo-American “technocrats.”110 Legal colonialism and domination by a few
legal systems (English and U.S. common law, French and Swiss civil law) may
be giving way to more diverse legal and hybrid systems (Asian, Islamic, Israeli)
that have already affected substantive and procedural law, and thus also have had
an impact on ethical rules and practices.111
Professor Rogers explicates how efforts at “harmonizing” some of these
ethical differences, in the particularities of witness preparation, document
production, and confidentiality through “international” (International Bar Association) or “transnational” standards, has already and can further result in
transnational “compromises” (such as in witness preparation practices and rules)
that may approximate the kinds of “universal” rules of transnational practice that
some practitioners and scholars think are desirable.112
Professor Rogers is a legal realist, however, and she just as carefully reviews
some of the newer challenges to any hopes for more uniform ethical standards.
Exploring in an up-to-date chapter113 on third party investments in both private
commercial arbitration and more hybrid or public investment arbitration, the
differences in both practices and nascent regulations of outside financial backers
of large stakes international dispute resolution, she demonstrates just how
complex transnational regulation can be, with widely varying national rules and

107. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983).
108. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 43–52.
109. See id. at 53–54.
110. See DEZALAY & GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE, supra note 2, at 38.
111. See generally UNIDROIT, ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (2006)
(explaining more information of how international institutions have incorporated diverse legal systems); see
also SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15.
112. See PAULSSON, IDEA, supra note 29, at 24.
113. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
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customs on the role of “outside” investors and interested parties in financing high
stakes dispute resolution. Professor Rogers goes further than many scholars and
practitioners in this area by also taking on the question of whether ethical
standards should be developed and applied to other “third parties” in arbitration,
such as experts and witnesses, especially when legal traditions differ dramatically
about their appointment (by tribunal or by party) and evidentiary value.114
Related to the issue of financial participation is the growing demand by many
“outside” parties (including employees, citizens, advocacy groups, and nongovernmental organizations) to simply participate in arbitration through amicus
briefs, presentations, testimony, and arguments, accompanied by demands for
more public, and transparent proceedings.115
Given the increasing use of arbitration processes in a wider variety of
transnational disputes, now including not only private commercial disputes or
public diplomatic disputes, the use of international arbitration or Investor State
Dispute Settlement in investment disputes also challenges many hopes for
universal or more uniform ethical standards. While “micro” ethics may be similar
(the behavior and conduct of lawyers, arbitrators, witnesses and experts) in the
conduct of hearings, more “macro” ethical issues, such as the publicity or
transparency of the proceedings, documents and awards116 in hybrid investment
disputes, now so significant in the political debates about trade agreements, are
quite different than in private commercial arbitration. Whether international
ethics in arbitration can be so capacious, plastic, or transcendent so as to include
both these macro/policy concerns and more micro/behavioral concerns remains
to be seen. Professor Rogers exposes these issues here, even if there are no
obvious solutions.117 As observed above, the challenge of her proposed
“functionalist” model of ethics in international arbitration might suggest that
when the functions are different (resolving private commercial disputes vs.
resolving state regulation of foreign direct investments) there might be a need for
more diverse and context-specific ethics standards.
The challenge of any statement of ethics standards is the level of generality in
which those standards are expressed. It is relatively easy to identify some “core”

114. Discussed more fully below is the rather big divide between most civil law systems in which experts are
appointed by the arbitrators (or judges) as “neutral” experts in service to the fact finding process, and common
law and adversarial systems where they are appointed by the parties to serve more partisan processes for fact
finding.
115. See World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/icsidlicsid2a.asp. [https://perma.cc/LG6P-D4KC] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015); Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF.htm [https://perma.cc/J6YW-6VP3] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
116. See S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing and Exceeding
the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016) (examining an account of
differences in legal systems and types of cases in international arbitration award and opinion writing and
transparency).
117. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at ch. 10.
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values of most legal proceedings (fairness, integrity, honesty, respectful behavior,
equality of evidence production opportunity (if not equality of “arms” and quality
of representation)). But, even at the most general level there are potentially
conflicting values of “ethics.” Consider as examples of these potentially
conflicting duties: loyalty to clients and duties to tribunals; keeping client
information confidential and being honest and transparent to tribunals; treating
others with integrity and respect and American-style “zealous” representation118
in the form of rigorous cross-examination; duty to protect clients (think corporate
clients with many different individuals) and their information (documents, trade
secrets etc.) and varying duties of disclosure to opposing parties or to the tribunal;
duties to present, past and possible future clients; conflicts presented by role
changes, from lawyer to arbitrator, from lawyer to judge, and movement from
one law firm to another or movement from private law work to engagement by
the state; movement from one “side” or argument on an issue to the “other”
(known as issue conflicts).119 These tensions exist in any legal ethics regime but
may be even more intensely experienced in international arbitration as lawyers
serve as both representatives and arbitrators or work in different kinds of practice
units (barrister chambers and multi-national law firms).120
Professor Rogers does not propose a specific draft set of rules or principles for
international arbitration in her book. She does illustrate, in Chapter 3, how these
issues have been treated in the existing case law, decisions and available rulings
from arbitral bodies, to suggest how international arbitral institutions might
deliberate on these issues and resolve at least some of the tensions, with more
specific guidance than general platitudes of good behavior. The more general the
formulation of a rule or standard, the less helpful it may be for specific behavioral
guidance. (This is the tension of “macro” ethics in expression and “micro-ethics”
in practice.). Any attempt to specify some “global” universal or international
standards may conflict with more local and national formulations of such rules. A
few examples follow to demonstrate her descriptive care and review of the issues.
In what long has plagued international arbitral practice, American ethical and
professional malpractice rules of witness preparation (and likely testimonial
rehearsal and coaching) have openly collided with several legal traditions of
explicitly prohibiting this practice. To varying degrees, France, Belgium,

118. Within the American ethics rules the former duty of “zealous advocacy” in the Code of Professional
Responsibility has been replaced with the more toned down requirement of “diligence” for the client, see MODEL
RULES R. 1.2, with the “zealous advocacy” language being relegated to the comment section. Despite the change
of language in the rule, however, most American lawyers still think their duty is to be a “zealous” and
adversarial advocate and the popular cultural images of the aggressive cross-examiner have long survived the
demise of Perry Mason on TV. See PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL ASIMOW, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES
TO THE MOVIES xix (1996); MICHAEL ASIMOW, LAWYERS IN YOUR LIVING ROOM: LAW ON TELEVISION 331 (2009);
DAVID PAPKE ET. AL., LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE, 365–66 (2d ed. 2011).
119. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 321–23.
120. See id. at 63.
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Germany and the United Kingdom,121 have placed restrictions on how much
pre-testimonial contact a lawyer may have with witnesses. Professor Rogers
reviews the variations in treatment of this issue through national rules and
practice and then explores “the elusive international consensus” that has
gradually emerged from deliberations in the non-governmental International Bar
Association.122 She then deftly explores how often compromise language in
multi-system legal ethics formulations does not fully deal with the problem. Does
the permitted witness “interviewing” allow payment for expert testimony? Does
it permit access to confidential information held by an employee or former
employee of an organizational client?123 Professor Rogers digs deep when she
describes a simple solution recognized by bar rules in Switzerland, Paris and
Brussels, which, recognizing this conflict of laws problem, allows an exception to
the no preparation of witness rules if the lawyer is appearing in an international
tribunal that has different rules.124 Professor Rogers describes these international
“compromises” as too often taking a “binary” view of an issue without more fully
exploring its complexity and possible variations. Disclosure of documents or
“American-style” discovery is another such example explored here.125 While
American lawyers (and increasingly British lawyers too) are permitted to “root
around” in the documents, even if adverse, of the other party, most civil lawyers
are not and many such documents are independently protected by corporate and
general privacy laws in Europe.126 Another product of our differentially
technologized world includes variable duties to return documents (whether paper
or electronic) that have inadvertently been delivered to the wrong parties, with
different ethical and procedural traditions of document production.127 This too
raises legal and cultural differences that probably require more specific, rather
than more general, drafting in ethical standards.

121. One of the classic John Mortimer RUMPOLE stories brought to television with Leo McKern in the
starring role demonstrates how a barrister seen speaking to a witness during a break in proceedings can get into a
lot of trouble. See RUMPOLE: RUMPOLE AND THE EXPERT WITNESS (BBC Radio 1981), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
programmes/b01pfx04 [http://perma.cc/K34G-YS89] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); RUMPOLE: RUMPOLE ON TRIAL
(BBC Radio 1992), http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01r1b3c (last visited Nov. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
4Y9P-A7ZJ].
122. Article 4(3) of the International Bar Association’s Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration provides, “It shall not be improper for a Party, its officers, employees, legal advisors or other
representatives to interview its witnesses or potential witnesses and to discuss their prospective testimony with
them.” International Bar Association, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (May 29,
2010).
123. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 172, 175–76. What might happen to a Belgian counsel who prepared and
rehearsed a witness in an international arbitration when national ethics rules still prohibit such practices? See id.
at 112–14.
124. Id. at 116.
125. Id. at 118–20.
126. This is a part of much larger cultural-legal issue currently being played out in different privacy laws and
rights in Europe and the United States, affecting data access, Google searches and “the right to be forgotten.”
127. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 118–20.
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Similar ethical cultural divides are explored in the book with respect to
conflicts of interests. The United States has the most detailed and particularized
rules about what constitutes a conflict (prior clients, former government service,
law firm imputation conflict if one member has a conflict, business dealings with
clients, acceptance of gifts or payments for legal services by third parties,
organizational conflicts).128 Other nations have either a different conception of
“conflicts of interest” (France’s notion of avoidance of “indelicacy”) or an
absence of formal regulation and sanction. Different configurations of practice in
different countries, including Asia, South America, and Europe with smaller units
of practice or shared office arrangements without stringent conflicts rules have
led in recent years to more complicated challenges to international arbitrators
coming from the same legal “chambers” or offices as some of the advocating
lawyers.129 At the level of award enforcement and challenges, some national
systems discipline such conflicts (as does the U.S. in some contexts) only when
actual harm has been shown (e.g., revelation of confidential information, disloyal
conduct, rulings in favor of former clients, actual financial interests in outcomes).130 As Professor Rogers suggests, some arbitral bodies are reluctant to
rule on such challenges, claiming lack of authority or lack of standards in
international settings.131 I would suggest they are also reluctant to rule on this
issue because they are often implicitly ruling on their own potential conflicts of
interest (of either the past, or the future, as they contemplate further work in the
field, as either arbitrators or representatives, known as “upstream” conflicts).132
Another area of different understandings of basic principles occurs with client
confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, especially as it affects representatives of corporate or organizational bodies. In many civil law countries
confidentiality is both broader and narrower than in the United States. Corporate
or trade secrets communicated from client to lawyer are often protected from
disclosure by the lawyer, but the advice from the lawyer to the client is not.133
Also contrary to American rules and practices, in some jurisdictions, lawyers
may have to keep their own communications with each other across adversary
lines confidential from their own clients! And, not unlike the variations among
states in the United States, different national134 systems require different

128. See MODEL RULES, R. 1.7–1.13.
129. Id. at 123 (discussing a move to disqualify a barrister who shared “office door” with President of an
arbitral tribunal in the case Hrvatska Elecktroprivreda D.D. v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/24, Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue (June 12, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/
Hrvatska-Interpretation.pdf [http://perma.cc/JGA9-YP8K] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015)).
130. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Al-Harbi v. Citibank,
85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
131. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 82–86, 90–98; PAULSSON, IDEA, supra note 29.
132. See MENKEL-MEADOW, supra note 22.
133. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 124–26.
134. Id.
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responses from lawyers who learn about client wrongdoing.135 Issues of what can
be argued or treated as evidence in international arbitrations may turn on different
ethical rules and practices in different national systems which require international arbitrators to make evidentiary rulings that may, in fact, implicate ethical
requirements, with potential for discipline or other penalty within a lawyer’s (or
witness’s) home country.
Perhaps the trickiest and most common ethical differences have over time been
the rules and practices of ex parte communication. American parties and lawyers
have moved into international arbitration with their domestic customs of
choosing partisan arbitrators with whom they continued to have private and
advocacy conversations during the arbitration proceedings.136 The tradition of
international arbitration most often requires “impartiality” or “neutrality” at least
after all the arbitrators are chosen. Over time even the American arbitration
institutions, such as the American Arbitration Association and its international
arm, International Center for Dispute Resolution, have moved to a notion of
“impartiality” and prohibition of most ex parte communication between representatives and arbitrators.137 Ironically, ex parte communications continues to be a
cultural issue as tradition and practice has not generally prohibited meals and
social contacts among arbitrators, lawyers and parties in Continental practice.
Now, in some cases involving China and other Asian countries, blurring of roles
from mediator to arbitrator or other function has blurred some of the lines of
communication, both prohibited and permitted. Just as in American med-arb
(mediation-arbitration hybrids) dispute resolution practice, there can be issues
with separate meetings (caucuses) with mediators who try to settle cases and then
later serve as arbitrators deciding matters on the basis of secret or non-shared or
responded to information.138 These issues, described with several case examples,
demonstrate the great variety of practices and confusion that may occur when
different nationals, subject to different, or no rules at all, participate in an
international hearing. Particular arbitral tribunals can set their own single case
“rules” for their proceedings. Increasingly, the rules of each of the arbitration
institutions may provide for default rules on the issue of ex parte communications
and expectations of impartiality. However, if the lawyers have different cultural
expectations about what is appropriate (conversations, sharing a meal, staying in
the same hotel), there may be different behaviors with respect to communications
that can have an effect on outcomes, and can lead to post-award challenges.
Professor Rogers does not offer a specific solution to these issues, but she
demonstrates how cultural practices may differ, but also may be converging, in

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 126–28.
Id.
See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 68.
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practice, if not in formal rules or decisions.139
Harder to regulate in any realistic way is the issue Professor Rogers calls
“creativity, aggression and bad manners.”140 These are the different cultural
practices in the legal profession and within different corporate cultures.
Non-Americans complain both about the aggressiveness of American lawyers
generally and about cross-examination practice in particular in international
arbitration. Non-Americans also are often surprised by the “creativity” of legal
arguments, departing from formal rules, contracts and laws, with creative
interpretations of evidence and contract terms as “zealous representation” of
clients.141 As Professor Rogers notes, arbitrators and American courts in
enforcement proceedings are now more likely to “sanction” with fines or other
penalties (including reduced attorney’s fees) particularly outrageous behaviors.
Still, it remains unclear what powers arbitrators or arbitration institutions have to
either curb this behavior or socialize for greater “civility.”142 Related to using
sanctioning powers is the issue of variations in how attorney’s fees are provided
for in different national cultures, including American style contingent fees or
British and some Continental “loser pays” attorneys’ fees shifting rules. These
kinds of fee issues are more likely to be dealt with explicitly in international
institutional rules but the effects of attorneys’ fees rules on different behavioral
assumptions in practice is less easily reconciled.
Professor Rogers notes that the arguments made for and against more
specificity in international arbitration rules are often contradictory. Many of the
first (and now second generations) of the “old guard” often argue that when
international arbitration was dominated by a small circle of mostly European
grand men (and often legal scholars, as well as distinguished lawyers), there was
more of an “informal common culture” of civility, good manners and accepted
norms of practice (as well as legal argumentation).143 But it is the very existence

139. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1, at 132–38.
140. See id. at 128–30.
141. This is not only an issue of practice or ethics. There is now vibrant scholarship on the different
jurisprudential approaches to contract interpretation in international arbitration from a substantive perspective.
See, e.g., Joshua Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 4 (2015);
ROBERT HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT LAW (1997); P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); Nottage,
Transnational Commercial Arbitration, supra note 2. Both the law of lex mercatoria, and the doctrines of ex
aequo et bono or conferred powers of amiable compositeur, now less frequently invoked or provided for in
arbitral agreement, provide for more “discretionary” interpretations of contract terms in international
arbitration. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION supra note 36.
142. See Patrick Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy and
Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (the discussion of civility in American legal practice has
been an issue for decades); Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Scalia: Why He’s a Bad Influence, L.A. TIMES (July 14,
2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0714-chemerinsky-scalia-bad-example-20150714-story.
html [http://perma.cc/52VT-MSPJ].
143. See arguments by leading arbitrators Jan Paulsson and Emanuel Gaillard on these issues, supra note 64.
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of the closed “old boy network” of the repeat players144 of international
arbitration that produced the first claims of conflicts of interest, and calls for
diversification of the profession, both from the arbitrator and representative side
of the legal work. Then ironically, more diversity in demographics of parties and
litigators, nations, and the types of matters in arbitration in turn has led to a
greater need for some rules to make the process more transparent and to level the
playing field for more diverse parties and matters, not necessarily schooled in the
same “old boy culture.” Recently, Emmanuel Gaillard has suggested that with
the increased diversification of the field, there is a more polarized, less
“solidaristic” understanding of expected role behavior.145 Thus the “cure” for the
increasingly less legitimate closed system of international arbitration of more
diversification and transparency of practice may in turn require even more
regulation or attempts at standardization in order to produce a system of
transnational dispute resolution that is predictable, efficient, transparent, and
accessible to all parties. But the actual content of such regulation may, just
because of that increased diversification, be more difficult to craft and negotiate
as new entrants, both parties and lawyers, seek to compete for arbitration work
and offer their more diverse ideas of what is fair and just.
Professor Rogers also explores a series of new issues brought to the forefront
in international arbitration by focusing on new players in the system. These
include third party investors in arbitration-litigation, increased use of experts and
technical witnesses, and the complex role of public parties (states and state
agencies in international investment disputes) and non-parties (e.g., NGOs and
other “interest groups”) in arbitrations that involve public issues.146 The
arbitration institutions have now all had to focus on new rules, at the intersection
of ethical and procedural rules, for allowing third party participation, both from a
financial and interest basis in order to structure systems with integrity and to
satisfy demands for due process and public participation, important values from
the “macro-ethical” perspective.147 To the extent that international arbitration has
become more “judicialized,”148 “Americanized” or “complexified” (all critiques
leveled at current administration and conduct of both investment and commercial
arbitration), the leading international arbitration institutions (ICC, LCIA, ICSID,
ICDR AAA) have all had to confront making new rules for the participation
(either financially or on an amicus-interest basis) by those beyond the actual
parties. Professor Rogers explores these new frontiers in arbitration practice in
144. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
145. Emmanuel Gaillard, Sociology of International Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 15 (2014).
146. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 177–217.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Remy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of
International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 (2014) (looking at increases in costs and administration
of high stakes matters at the ICC, LCIA, ICDR and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce).
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Chapters four and five, once again providing good summaries and source
material for these complicated issues.149
The use of expert witnesses in arbitration is another illustration of the cultural
complexity in transnational litigation. Classically “adversarial” cultures like the
U.S., Australian, and Canadian cultures are more likely to seek to use partisan,
party-chosen and paid-for experts for a variety of technical issues (market
information, valuation, architects and engineers for construction and other kinds
of disputes, as well as lawyers and law professors as experts on foreign law).
Conversely, the civil law courts (and to some extent the U.K.) have traditionally
used judge or arbitration panel appointed experts to “report” more directly to the
decisional body.150 This is not merely an issue of procedural difference, but can
be one of serious epistemological differences. The American adversarial model
argues that the truth emerges best from contests of “facts” and in the case of
experts, even “opinions,” about technical matters. Civil law systems are more
likely to approach “expertise” as “truth” or “fact” to be presented to the decision
maker who has chosen the appropriate scientist or expert more “neutrally.”151
This is also the result of some of the other basic differences at the systemic
(“family” of legal traditions) level—American adversarial preferences for
attorney controlled evidence production versus the conventional conceptions of
the inquisitorial model where judges are more in control of evidence production
and management. Professor Rogers chronicles a growing convergence in practice
and rules among the major arbitral institutions.152 However she notes that within
her framework of “functional analysis” of ethics issues, that national traditions of
tribunal versus party appointed experts continue to present difficulties at both the
procedural and ethical levels153 and remain problematic in many arbitrations
where rules of procedure, evidence, and ethics are not governed by either contract
or acceptance of one of the major arbitral institutions’ rules.
Recent practices of third party investors in both investment-state arbitration
and commercial arbitration also demonstrate the continuing tensions of different
national rules and traditions. A few jurisdictions (Australia and the U.K.) have
now authorized non-lawyer investments in law firms154 and in litigation. In
others (U.S.), the practice of “investing” in litigation (and arbitration) has begun
without clear regulation as it is often difficult to pinpoint who is really paying for

149. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1, at 139–217.
150. Id. at 141–57.
151. The American system of expert witnesses and the dangers of “junk science” have more recently been
addressed in a series of cases, following on from Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(1993), requiring judges to do some initial screening of the qualifications of the expert witness and the degree of
certainty and scientific merit of the proffered testimony, perhaps another example of some “convergence”
internationally in the rules of litigation and practice.
152. See generally ROGERS, supra note 1, at 157–76.
153. Id. at 171–75.
154. Id. at 178–79.
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the lawyers or legal proceedings in international proceedings. Parties outside of a
particular dispute see the importance of controlling or seeking to affect particular
rulings with potentially precedential or other “external” effects. Note again the
irony of increased complexity and regulation in international arbitration. With a
call for greater transparency and disclosure of awards, opinions and rulings, the
stakes of those outside of the particular disputants to affect those outcomes
becomes even greater. This applies particularly in investment arbitration where
arbitrators may, in effect, overrule national laws or at least award large amounts
of compensation to foreign investors when national laws seek to regulate their
conduct.
Thus, desires for greater transparency and disclosure of the entire arbitration
process also demand disclosure of funders of the litigation, which deprives
international arbitration of one of its key advantages—privacy and confidentiality. Note again, the tensions and antinomies endemic to international arbitration
practice—desires to make the system more transparent and accountable to those
outside the dispute itself inevitably run up against the qualities that make
arbitration particularly attractive to those inside who seek confidentiality or
privacy. While progressive “globalists” and advocates for more informal global
governance seek to make international dispute resolution and governance more
accountable by disclosures of various kinds, there is an inevitable tension when at
least some processes (especially diplomatic negotiation and mediation) often
work better when the parties are assured some secrecy and confidentially and
freedom of action.155
Though somewhat beyond the scope of this review, these issues do provide an
opportunity for further exploration of what Professor Rogers’s terms the
“functional ethics” divide between arbitral proceedings and those of other
dispute resolution processes. To the extent that decisional processes like
international arbitration (in both commercial and investment disputes) are more
like adjudication, with command orders and awards (more like rabbits?), they
may require more disclosure and transparency in all issues, than mediation or
some forms of negotiation, which are designed to be more “consensual” and
controlled by the parties. The argument is that if parties must “consent” to
agreements in negotiation and mediation, they must be permitted to choose their
rules of engagement and degree of disclosure (allowing more freedom to move
away from stated positions and to consider future-oriented and more creative
solutions than adjudication of “past” facts and contractually or legally based

155. See commentary emerging from recently agreed to Iranian-Nuclear Agreement on what was
accomplished by secret and confidential negotiations and what should now be disclosed in more public approval
stages; see, e.g., David Sanger & Michael Gordon, Clearing Hurdles to Iran Nuclear Deal With Standoffs,
Shouts and Compromise, NEW YORK TIMES, July 16, 2015, at A1; Robin Wright, Tehran’s Promise, THE NEW
YORKER, July 27, 2015, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/27/tehrans-promise [http://perma.cc/
UZ7B-FCGK].
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liabilities).156 Of course, mediated and negotiated agreements, just like arbitral
awards, also have impacts on third parties and thus demands for full disclosure
and transparency have also been made with respect to those processes as well.157
However, I, like Professor Rogers, have argued that different functions of these
different processes may necessitate different ethical requirements.158
Professor Rogers’s treatment of the third party funding issues is a good,
exhaustive review of the current issues that stem from outside funding in
arbitration (and all litigation). It provides extensive review of the current
differences in national laws that govern these practices and reviews the myriad of
ethical issues that occur when there are outside investors, whether silent or
known. These ethical concerns include conflicts of interests between and among
investors and arbitrators, lawyers, witnesses (the “repeat player” phenomenon of
interests in continuing work and support), manipulation of cases for issue
precedents, moral hazard when those who are not paying for the litigation are the
principal parties, corporate governance issues when others “control” corporate
policy or dispute resolution strategy without board or governance approval,
“concentrations” of influence and power on particular disputes or issues, and
among other issues, the potential for increased enforcement challenges as hidden
funders are discovered after the fact, and conflicts of interest become apparent
after the earlier challenge periods have passed under arbitral rules.159 Most
concerning to Professor Rogers and many scholars is that “massive funds being
injected into international arbitration have the potential to restructure the entire
field. On the other hand, those who control those funds are completely
unregulated and beyond the effective reach of any regulator.”160 She references
the recent multi-year, multi-venue litigation between Chevron and Ecuador over
environmental damage in foreign investment on indigenous land as a “cautionary
tale.”161
Professor Rogers has given us a tour de force of description of the ethical
issues implicated in transnational arbitration practice, still rooted in national
156. See generally. WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler,
eds., 2006) [hereinafter WHAT’S FAIR]; ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS (2011).
157. See generally, WHAT’S FAIR, supra note 156.
158. See Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 11; Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice, supra note
11. For decades ethicists have argued for more honesty and disclosure in legal negotiations, with little success,
as legal negotiators argue that parties must be able to change positions, dissemble their real interests, because
that is part of the universal and empirical negotiation culture, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality and
Professional Responsibility in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE (Phyllis
Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many “Cs” of Professional
Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 979 (2001).
159. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 188–209.
160. Id. at 210.
161. Id. at 215. For further reading on the Chevron-Ecuador litigation, see Judith Kimerling, Lessons from
the Chevron Ecuador Litigation: The Proposed Intervenors’Perspective, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 241 (2013);
PAUL M. BARRETT, LAW OF THE JUNGLE: THE $19 BILLION DOLLAR BATTLE OVER OIL IN THE RAIN FOREST AND THE
LAWYER WHO WOULD STOP AT NOTHING TO WIN (2014).
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regulation or an absence of clear ethical guidance at the international level. She
also exposes the absence, at the present time, of any clear or uniform set of
enforcement procedures, outcomes or institutions to manage any enforcement of
any regulations that might be developed.162 Her basic thesis and proposal to
remedy these concerns is for international arbitration to follow on from its
foundational roots—voluntary, internal and international self-regulation, with
the promulgation of standards, rules and guidelines by the international
non-governmental organizations that currently define the field (e.g. the ICC,
LCIA, IBA, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee
(CIETAC), UNCITRAL, Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC);
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and others). Then there
should be self-enforcement by internal processes within these organizations and
the arbitration panels that they administer.163 She illustrates how this might work
with some recent examples of more or less successful efforts at self-regulation,
such as by the Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales (ALF),
which, in 2011, promulgated a voluntary ethics code for external funders of
litigation, but which has also been criticized for its vague standards and lack of
effective enforcement mechanisms.164 Thus, the key questions for the field and
this reviewer remain: how can international arbitration ensure its integrity,
legitimacy and acceptability? Can transnational ethics regulation perform this
function and if so how? In the final section below, I offer some critiques and
concerns about what remains to be addressed after reading Professor Rogers’s
excellent descriptions and analyses—just what are the possibilities of success for
her prescriptions?

III. QUESTIONS, CRITIQUES, AND CONCERNS: IS TRANSNATIONAL ETHICAL
PRACTICE REGULATION POSSIBLE IN A WORLD OF LEGAL PLURALISM?
This review began with the question: “When we talk about ethics in
international arbitration, what are we concerned about?” Professor Rogers has
illustrated and described our concerns with the challenges to the legitimacy and
acceptability of an important transnational system of dispute resolution which
now affects the commercial, industrial, environmental, human rights, and
personal wellbeing of much of the world’s population, whether in developed or
still developing nations. Those challenges include conflicts of interests of repeat
players, those who would manipulate both national and international rules of
trade, commerce and regulation for their own economic gain. It also includes lack
of transparency and participation in rulings and awards that can affect millions of

162. Rogers, supra note 1, at 132–38.
163. Id. at 365–72 (proposing a regime of “self-regulation” by administering arbitral organizations and
tribunals).
164. Id. at 210.
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people, decentralization and privatization of decision-making that many believe
should be in the public sphere, and the domination of global legal decisionmaking by a small, if growing, group of professionals, primarily from the western
and developed world. This is, in part, a story of “the relationship between insiders
and outsiders” of a transnational system of justice, affecting potentially billions
of people. Professor Rogers tells us her own interest in the subject came from her
own “nightmarish lesson in ethics” when the partner she worked for in an
international arbitration practice was being sent to jail for committing “serious
criminal offenses in a client-related matter.”165 Many serious scandals have made
the public aware of what can happen in transnational dispute resolution when the
proceedings are private and controlled by the parties within the disputes. These
range from corporate misconduct (Enron, London Interbank Offer Rate
(LIBOR166), MCI, HSBC Bank, Yukos oil), to political and economic failures
(Argentina crisis of 2000, world economic recession 2008), as well as more
“ordinary” but financially significant disputes (credit defaults, private investment
and governmental corruption).
Professor Rogers proposes a relatively modest solution to some of these issues.
International arbitration originated in voluntary contracts, agreements and
undertakings between commercial partners and then states, bolstered by also
voluntary agreements to enter into public law treaties (both investment and
commercial treaties with both substantive and procedural commitments and
general enforcement treaties, The New York Convention for Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Washington Convention).
Given its origins, she suggests that ethical regulation, though clearly necessary,
should also be voluntary and internal to those who practice or use the system of
international arbitration.167
Using a Functional Theory of the purposes and roles of international arbitrators
(who are both contract service providers and private adjudicators) in the global
system of justice, she suggests that the major international arbitration institutions
should develop a “more robust and meaningful definition of arbitrators’ duty of
impartiality”168 to reduce bias or appearances of bias. These institutions should
also address a variety of other specific issues (uses of partisan arbitrators, third
party investment in arbitration cases, conflicts of interest, corruption), as well as
to resolve some issues of cultural differences in legal practice (e.g., production of
documents and discovery, evidence production, confidentiality and privilege,
cross examination, use of expert witnesses, attorney’s fees and other issues of
attorney conduct).169

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at ix.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 13–14, 17–56, 365–72.
Id. at 60–63.
See generally id. at 57–98.
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Acting on her own prescriptions, she has, as a separate, but related, activity
from her book, established an important new website, Arbitrator Intelligence.org.
This website is intended to correct some of the information and power
asymmetries between the insiders and outsiders by publishing arbitration awards
and feedback on particular arbitrators.170 This is an important attempt of a private
person’s (within the arbitration community) public intervention into the privacy
of the international arbitration system.
Professor Rogers acknowledges in her final chapter, she may be building
“castles in the air-pretty, ethereal aspirations that have little to do with the serious,
practical business of resolving international arbitral disputes.”171 Yet, at the same
time, her book172 demonstrates that there has been change and development in
the regulation of international arbitration ethics: “The absence of a duty for
arbitrators to investigate potential conflicts seemed reasonable, until it was
not.”173 Arbitration institutions have changed rules to require investigation and
disclosure of conflicts of interest, as national courts also increased scrutiny of
investigation and disclosure in enforcement proceedings, as more and more
challenges (and academic commentary) raised questions about the conflicts of
interest and self-dealing of both arbitrators and counsel in many proceedings. The
work of the IBA, ILA, the ICC, CPR, LCIA, UNCITRAL and many other
international bodies in recent years has included dozens of internal committees
and inquires to draft rules and guidelines at varying degrees of specificity to deal
with many of the issues outlined in Professor Rogers’s book (and including other
important issues like powers to grant interim measures, injunctions, justiciability
and arbitrability in cases alleging corruption and other public law matters). Some
of these organizations have also provided internal ethics committees to provide
ethical guidance and even rulings on challenges. Professor Rogers describes
places and issues where there was difference and contest (e.g. witness preparation, document production and appointment of partisan arbitrators and experts)
and now there is more convergence (IBA Guidelines on Evidence Rules,
Conflicts of Interest) in practice and in rules. This demonstrates how the informal
processes of private professional organizations, interacting with public litigation
and legal scholarship, has indeed accomplished rule (and we hope, but don’t
really know) and behavioral change.174

170. See ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, www.Arbitratorintelligence.org [http://perma.cc/5FR9-TQFX] (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
171. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 365.
172. Id. at 367, 247–49.
173. Id.
174. Though there clearly has been an increase in ethical sensitivity, rule drafting and litigation about ethical
behavior, there are also many claims that behavior in arbitration has actually gotten worse—called “guerrilla
tactics” by some commentators, see, e.g., supra Part III; PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
(Loukas Mistelis & Julian Lew eds., 2006).
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Thus, Professor Rogers sees an evolutionary process of dialogue, engagement,
and drafting by the leading arbitration institutions and professionals to slowly
create the “common law” as it might be (including particular codes and
decisions) of an international ethics regime for international and transnational
practice as called for by many commentators over the last few decades.175 Her
book presents evidence of this work in progress, with the fits and starts of
conflicting and competing codes and resolutions of complicated issues by
arbitration panels and enforcing national courts.176 This book introduces the
possibility of an ongoing treatise (European style) and reporter of ethics
decisions in international arbitration from around the world.177 Perhaps some
junior scholar or arbitration institution will take on that important project.178 It
also demonstrates how international arbitration ethics “law” may become as
cumbersome and casuistic as American legal ethics, with different state
codifications of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and great varieties in
case law interpretations in different locations of practice.179
For all these strengths, and there are many, this reader was still left yearning for
more. Many readers who labor in these fields would have wished for a suggested
formulation of actual and specific rules, guidelines and standards, especially from
one, like Professor Rogers, who has already written so much about the specific
issues treated here and who has served on many of the international drafting or

175. See, e.g., Detlev Vagts, Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 677 (2000); Detlev Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for
Governance?, 90 AM J. INTL L. 250 (1996); LAWYERS’ PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW (John J.
Barceló III & Roger Cramton eds. 1999); John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Conduct for
Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 673, 673 (1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION:
THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 861 (1971); Jan Paulsson, Standards
of Conduct for Counsel in International Arbitration, 3 AM REV. INT’L ARB. 214 (1992); Carolyn Lamm et al.,
Has the Time Come for an ICSID Code of Ethics for Counsel?, in 2009-2010 Y. B. INT’L INV. L & POL’Y (Karl
Sauvant ed. 2010); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 22.
176. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 86–87.
177. Structurally the Table of Cases at the beginning of this volume provides, by country, and international
body, the outline for such a text. It would have been helpful to have cases listed specifically by issue as well (the
outline of a possible treatise for the future). The index at the back might also have provided more categories of
subjects for ease of finding cases, specific rules, scholarly articles etc. Though I have applauded the use of
European style numbered paragraphs in the text, the book might have benefitted from an alpha organized
bibliography at the back of all articles, books and cases cited, as well as listings by subject area. Professor
Rogers’s research is comprehensive but as a research tool it is often difficult to “refind” a particular source
buried in a footnote in the text. These are stylistic quibbles for what is still a comprehensive and excellent
research tool but authors and editors should take note of different methods of organizing such field defining
works.
178. Leading arbitration casebooks, textbooks and treatises now report some of the leading cases and issues
but there is as yet no comprehensive single international treatise that reports on all ethical issues and decisions in
international arbitration. See generally, GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2014);
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION (5th ed., 2014).
179. Including particular agencies like the IRS or SEC that promulgate their own rules of practice and ethics.
Many have long argued for national bar standards for admission and ethical regulation in the United States
where legal practice now transcends state lines.
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policy committees.180 How should third party funders be regulated in international arbitration? How does the “functional analysis” she proposes affect
possible standards for conflicts of interest or non-governmental organizational
participation rules in commercial versus investment arbitrations? Is one set of
ethical rules possible for these very different subject matter arbitrations? While
she makes important specific suggestions that national legal professional
regulations should make “exceptions” or choice of law rules for international
practice venues,181 she might further specify how actual enforcement of ethical
rules and standards can be productively shared by arbitration panels, institutions,
national, regional and international courts (fines, sanctions, disqualifications),
especially where scholars are exploring the relations of national courts to
international tribunals in so many other areas.182 Who will regulate and enforce
ethical standards and conduct in ad hoc, non-administered international arbitration? Should ethical standards that evolve in international commercial and
investment arbitration be applied to state to state arbitration (still used in
border/boundary and other public law disputes)? What rules and standards could
or should be applied in the newer treaties that provide for arbitration as one of a
tiered set of alternative forms of dispute resolution in public law disputes, as in
the Law of the Sea Treaty, many environmental and other treaties?183
Explorations of a few larger issues might have nested this important work in
significant issues of global governance. Who is actually harmed by ethical
“violations” or transgressions? Why do we care about international arbitration
ethics from the perspective of a cost/benefit analysis? Who benefits from the
current system of amorphous or vague standards of ethics and enforcement; other
counsel, would-be new international arbitrators, multi-national corporations,
indigenous parties in investment arbitrations, local citizens, the judiciary,
national or international courts and tribunals, the international commercial world
order? Who are the interested players and how does international arbitration
ethics contribute to questions of international substantive justice or access to
justice for aggrieved parties?184 How do “ethical” international arbitrators or
lawyers contribute (or not) to global peace, security, predictability, innovation,

180. In my years of writing scholarship on rules in ADR I learned that the best test of scholarship is
participation in actual rule drafting and I thank Professor Geoffrey Hazard for his work on the CPR-Georgetown
Commission on Ethics in ADR and his demonstration of rule drafting acuity and precision, as well as his work in
chairing the ABA Committees for revision of the Model Rules so many times. Professor Rogers is currently a
Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law of International Arbitration, Third.
181. See ROGERS, supra note 1, at 114–17.
182. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue, supra note 12; SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15; SHANY,
EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 15.
183. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S 397,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm [http://perma.cc/
K7YT-FUEJ].
184. The World Bank now maintains a special body, the World Bank Inspection Panel to receive complaints
and investigate claims of World Bank investment funds being used to the disadvantage of local communities.
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justice, wealth enhancement or redistribution or human flourishing?185 While
treatment of these issues may be implicit in the text, there is an absence of some
of the most pointed critics of the international investment and arbitration system,
seen by some to be a tool of the hegemonic order of western world capitalism.186
What are the alternatives to which the international arbitration regime could be
compared? Transnational litigation?187 Mediation or other forms of dispute
resolution?188
What other models of ethical regulation of arbitration might there be? What are
comparisons to the current efforts at ethical regulation of counsel and judges in
international tribunals?189 Are there other examples of transnational professional
regulations such as international pilots, admiralty rules, public health professionals (World Health Organization), private international medical and emergency
service providers, e.g. International Red Cross, Medicens Sans Frontiers,
Antarctic and other research scientists, Interpol, anti-terrorism transnational
professionals, amongst others, we should look to? In my own work on legal
ethics over the decades it has been instructive to look not only at the pluralism
within our own profession (differences for prosecutors, big firm lawyers,
mediators) but to see how other professions within our own country deal with
similar issues (accountants for disclosure of economic fraud, doctors and nurses
for informed consent and patient-client counseling, engineers and architects for
substantive liability and outcome assessment, clergy for confidentiality protections, etc.). To what other professions might international arbitrators be
compared? Is there a danger that American legal ethics, more developed in both
codifications and case law, will “dominate” the development of international
legal ethical standards, as American adversary practice has affected the conduct
of arbitration practice? How can we insure full international participation in the
creation and implementation of ethical standards for international arbitration?
Professor Rogers’s book does address the pluralism of comparative legal
profession regulation and the different choices made by different national
systems, but I wonder if some of the big comparative and substantive law
questions might have been more foregrounded because they are so significant for

See THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/AboutUs.aspx [http://
perma.cc/6FEU-4ADZ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
185. These are big empirical and philosophical questions which are difficult to operationalize and measure,
but see generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013); David S. Grewal, The Laws
of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014).
186. See SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE, supra note 31; Kennedy, Three Globalizations, supra note 5. Though I
do not think it entirely fair, some readers might think that Professor Rogers has been too deferential to the
“establishment” of the international arbitration community in their more tepid writings on ethics in arbitration.
187. See generally DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III, MICHAEL RAMSEY & CHRISTOPHER WHYTOCK, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2015).
188. See generally NADJA ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MEDIATION LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2009).
189. HAGUE PRINCIPLES, supra note 42; SHANY, EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 15; SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, supra note 15.
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this project. Substantive issues of privacy regulation, corporate confidentiality,
rules of contract interpretation and discretion, common law versus civil law
reasoning,190 duties to clients and tribunals, allocation of fees and costs are all
issues about which legal regimes differ and how they will be harmonized (or not)
in both ethical rules and procedural rules for international arbitration remains
unclear here, both substantively and in terms of what processes will be used to
“harmonize” different legal traditions.191

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Professor Rogers’s Ethics in International Arbitration is about more than
ethics and international arbitration. For skeptics, and there are many, of anything
that can be called “transnational law,”—law not tethered to a particular
territory—her book provides a clear illustration that there is “transnational law.”
Such law resides in the interlocking and related rules and practices within arbitral
tribunals and institutions, as interpreted by arbitrators and then sometimes (in
enforcement or other proceedings) by national judges. Those practices and
rulings influence and affect others in transnational, trans-organizational and
trans-institutional settings where substantive, procedural and ethical issues are
debated, drafted and decided. Transnational legal development is more than
“dialogic.” It is “multi-logic” with an international common law developing at all
of these levels of the law.
At the same time, her book also demonstrates that although there are areas of
some “convergence” in ethical standards (treatment of corruption in arbitration
and in international commercial dealings, witness preparation, document production), hopes that there will be any easy “core” of ethical standards applicable to
all of international arbitration are likely naı̈ve. Legal ethics are complicated
enough in most domestic settings (and in the United States are variable by state).
Legal ethics applied across a variety of different families (common, civil, hybrid,
religious) of legal systems necessarily implicates difficult questions of comparative law, also at all levels of substantive, procedural and ethical “law,” (duties to
clients vs. organizations or the state, disclosure and confidentiality, fees and costs
structures, code versus decisional law argumentation, and ultimately, perhaps
even legal reasoning itself).

190. See generally K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d
ed. 1998) (for a comparative introduction to common and civil law systems).
191. Some descriptions of some of the harmonizing comparative law projects, UNIDROIT-ALI might have
been useful here, or as comparison the acrimony of the negotiations for the Hague Convention on the
recognition of Foreign Judgments. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Feb. 1, 1971),
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act⫽conventions.text&cid⫽78 [http://perma.cc/7G92-DJ4S] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015).
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The examples in this well-structured book make patently clear that there is
legal practice that now crosses national borders and exists in a space either not
regulated at all (no formal ethical rules currently enforceable in any supranational
international arbitral review board or court) or regulated or ruled-on in many
different spaces, either sequentially or contemporaneously (arbitral institutions,
tribunals, panels, national courts and professional disciplinary bodies). The field
of international arbitration is no longer dominated by a generation of “grand old
men” of Europe, politely observing their own versions of gentlemanly practice
with each other (“the invisible college”192), if they ever did. The subject matters
of international arbitration are increasingly complex. Often they involve multiple
parties, including states as formal parties and other interested groups seeking to
intervene and influence the process.193 The use of arbitration has moved globally
with an increasing market for arbitration proceedings in Asia, South America,
and the Middle East, with new arbitral bodies competing for caseloads and
governance over the process.194 There has been a slow growing diversification of
the parties, their lawyers and even their arbitrators,195 as newer entrants to both
commercial activity and the legal profession come from a wider range of
countries, ethnic backgrounds, and legal or commercial traditions, as well as
from different classes, genders, and religions.196
The transnational legal practice of international arbitration is, in my view (and
I think in Professor Rogers’s too) sui generis. It now has various forms and
subject matter variations, including commercial-contract, investment, and public
law treaty disputes, as well as a few very specialized compensatory tribunals
(torts, human rights), such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and U.N. Claims
Tribunal for the Iraq-Iran War.197 Forms of arbitration are used in some public
international organizations, such as the WTO and the Law of the Sea Tribunal.
From these diverse locations of the uses of international arbitration procedures
and processes, a body of law (rules, codes and decisional law), scholarly
commentary, and professional association deliberations has begun to develop a

192. ROGERS, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Oscar Schacter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72
NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977)).
193. The World Trade Organization, not formally part of Professor Rogers’s subject here, as well as some of
the hybrid arbitral institutions, including ICSID, have promulgated rules allowing participation of third parties,
some with permission or vetoes of the parties and others by rulings of the arbitral panel. World Bank, ICSID
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_
English-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/473U-LQFW] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).
194. See REMY GERBAY, THE FUNCTIONS OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS: THEORETICAL REPRESENTATIONS AND
PRACTICAL REALITIES 10–14 (2014) (Ph.D. thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, School of International
Arbitration).
195. See FRANCK, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9; cf. Benjamin G. Davis, Diversity in
International Arbitration, 20 DIS. RESOL. MAG. 13 (Winter 2014).
196. The impact of shari’a law and Islamic finance is a growing issue in international arbitration. See, e.g.,
WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW (2005).
197. McGovern, Dispute System, supra note 89.
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jurisprudence of ethics for this practice. Professor Rogers well describes those
processes and the development of that jurisprudence in her book.
Legal ethics jurisprudence in international arbitration appears to be developing
at both inductive (from particular cases) and deductive (general rules laid down
in advance) levels at the same time, with the enactment of generalized ethics
codes by arbitral institutions and the decisions and cases of arbitrators and
national court rulings. At a philosophical level these developments could be
analyzed from a deontological (specific duties) or ontological (essentialism or
natural law, e.g. are arbitrators ducks or rabbits?) rationale, or both. At a practical
level, the field of ethics in international arbitration must confront the important
question of whether to draft and regulate in aspirational, general and transsystemic198 language, or whether to aim, with greater specificity, to provide
behavioral guidance through clear guidelines. The danger of the first is to be so
vague as to provide no guidance; the danger of the latter is that significant ethical
issues cannot be dealt with by specific, brittle, binary rules, when nuance,
wisdom and judgment may be called for.199
For further development of a jurisprudence of legal ethics, Professor Rogers
has well outlined the leading ethical issues that international arbitration presents
from her conceptualization of a “Functional” (role-defined) approach, often
exploring the conflation or complication of ethics and procedural matters. These
include:
• Role of arbitrator—impartiality, integrity, non-bias and independence,
conflicts of interest, disqualifications, fees, confidentiality (privacy), competence, diligence, and liability, selection procedures, decisional powers
(written awards, interim measures), dealing with corruption and other illegal
activities (e.g. bribes);
• Role of attorney in international arbitration—conflicts of interest, duty to
client, tribunal, others (state, organization), privilege, competence, diligence
and experience, practice duties (e.g., witness preparation, disclosure and
information exchange, ex parte communications), litigation “manners” (e.g.
cross-examination), fees;
• Role of experts—competence, neutrality, loyalty, selection, duty to tribunal
or party, fees;
• Role of Third Party Funders—disclosure, relation to parties, attorneys and
arbitrators, conflicts of interests, manipulation of cases and issues, feesplitting, confidences.

198. Peter Strauss, Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment? Is McGill Leading the
Way?, 56 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 161 (2006).
199. This tension has long been present in the American Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, moving
over time from Canons, Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations to Blackletter Rules with Commentary
and permitting casuistic reasoning in bar opinions and legal decisions.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746233

2016]

ETHICAL ORDERING IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE?

251

Beyond this “micro” role-based functional approach, Professor Rogers also
adduces the “macro” or systemic ethical issues raised by international arbitration,
even as these are less susceptible of rule or standard drafting:
• System Legitimacy—procedural justice, participation, fairness, transparency,
rule of law or other decisional justification, outcomes, different measurements of “justice”—to parties, others affected, public, reviews and appeals;
• Licensing, certification of arbitrators/attorneys;
• Enforcement—venues, locations and levels of enforcement of ethical,
procedural and other standards; finality, appeal; self-regulation (proposed by
Professor Rogers), arbitral institutions, courts, international bodies or
other/sanctions/external regulation-national courts?

Professor Rogers’s “functional” and “self-regulating” approaches provide a
useful framework for assessing the specific role-based ethics issues of the
participants inside arbitral processes and provide a useful resource for considering alternative issues and formulations of rules and policies for those roles. This
functional approach, however, provides less guidance for consideration of the
systemic and public issues implicated in the use of international arbitration. Thus,
issues of accountability or transparency, including publication of awards,
creation of appeals bodies and participation of outsiders to the immediate dispute,
get less attention here, but are the subjects of much of the current debate about the
use of arbitration in international trade treaties. Professor Rogers book is Ethics
in International Arbitration; not “ethics of international arbitration.”
Thus, much work remains to be done to elaborate on particular, microbehavioral and inductive approaches to specific ethical rules for the conduct of
arbitration (in different contexts). Scholars must also continue to debate the larger
jurisprudential questions of the “ethics” of the use of a private dispute resolution
process, international arbitration, for the resolution of a wide variety of
transborder disputes, many with public policy issues and effects on those outside
of the system.
Ethics in International Arbitration is a magisterial collection of issues,
arguments, legal sources and a modest regulatory proposal, which enlightens and
informs on many important issues, even if it doesn’t fully resolve important
issues of transnational norm creation, systemic legitimacy, and enforcement.
Professor Rogers has clearly established several important principles with her
book:
• Legal ethics standards in international arbitration are required for systemic
legitimacy.
• Legal ethical standards can be discursively and plurally created in a
transnational legal system.
• Legal ethics standards may be plurally enforced in several venues (national
courts, professional associations and arbitral institutions).
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Professor Rogers prefers to keep creation and enforcement of arbitral ethical
standards within the sui generis transnational legal process that created international arbitration—internally within the international arbitration “community.”200 As a member of that community she has begun to further that project,
both with this comprehensive book and her new webpage endeavor,201 seeking to
make international arbitration more transparent, and providing information to
those who might enter the field.
As one who has long urged the creation of ethical standards, best practices, and
principles in the practice and conduct of international arbitration (and all forms of
dispute resolution), I applaud this work and look forward to the diverse reactions
it is likely to inspire as we aim to create standards for both good practice and
systemic legitimacy in a world of plural transnational legal dispute resolution.

200. This, of course, tracks the general idea of professional regulation within the American legal profession
(self-regulation by the Bar with occasional forays into discipline, disqualification and other sanctions by public
courts). This is also how the modern international tribunals have thus far dealt with their ethical regulation of
lawyers appearing before international bodies. See SARVARIAN, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 15.
201. ROGERS, supra note 1.
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